American Manpower: Work and Masculinity in the 1970s by Ludas, Victoria
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds_legacy/244 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Open Access Legacy Dissertations and Capstone Projects 
2011 
American Manpower: Work and Masculinity in the 1970s 
Victoria Ludas 








AMERICAN MANPOWER:  








A Master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial 








This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies 





_____________________________                    ___________________ 






_____________________________                    ___________________ 
Robert Singer,              Date 


















Thanks first of all to my advisor, Joseph Entin of Brooklyn College and the Graduate 
Center, for working with me to strengthen this paper through a constructive combination 
of encouragement and criticism, and to Robert Singer of the Liberal Studies Department 
for his good cheer and guidance. Thanks also to my fiancé Seth Orlofsky, whose constant 
support, editorial skill, and love helped me out of many a moment of uncertainty. Finally, 
much appreciation to the librarians of the Mina Rees Library of the Graduate Center 
(CUNY), the Charles Evans Inniss Memorial Library of Medgar Evers College (CUNY), 
and the Central Branch of the Brooklyn Public Library, without whom this paper could 
not have been written. 
 





Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1 
Work ........................................................................................................................................ 5 
Masculinity ............................................................................................................................ 12 
Current Discussion ................................................................................................................. 18 
Chapter 1: Changes in the World of the White American Man ..................................................... 25 
Employment by the Numbers ................................................................................................ 25 
Economic Trends ................................................................................................................... 33 
Political and Social Developments ........................................................................................ 44 
Chapter 2: Popular Discourses of Employment and Masculinity .................................................. 51 
Men and Employment ............................................................................................................ 51 
A ‘New’ Masculinity? ............................................................................................................ 60 
Chapter 3: Men’s Liberation .......................................................................................................... 66 
The Movement ....................................................................................................................... 67 
The Genre............................................................................................................................... 73 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 84 







It is one of America’s tragedies that we have come to believe that a man is what 
he does for a living. Chiefly that. If women also do what he does for a living, is 
he less than he was? Less than a man ought to be? Are his victories made small 
because women also enjoy them? What is a man in our society who loses a job? 
A man who loses his job loses his identity.  
 
Jean Way Schoonover, president, Dudley-Anderson-Yutzy Public Relations (1974) 
 
[T]rying to seem manly is a kind of “work,” and work imposes stress and consumes 
energy. Manliness, then, seems to carry with it a chronic burden of stress and energy-
expenditure which could be a factor related to man’s relatively shorter life-span. 
Sidney M. Jourard, “Some Lethal Aspects of the Male Role” in Men and Masculinity (1974) 
 
“Be a man!” What a strange order, yet it runs through so many human societies. 
We do not rush out to daughters and urge them to be women.  





Over the course of the 1970s, due to a series of economic and social changes, the 
state of work in America was forever altered. White male employment became less and 
less the prosperous stronghold it had been during the postwar boom years of the 1950s 
and 1960s. The decade saw an overall rise in unemployment through the 1970s and into 
the 1980s; the recessions of 1973-1975 and 1979-1980; deindustrialization and the 
corresponding decline in manufacturing jobs; oil crises; and administrations that cared 
more about fighting inflation than unemployment. In addition, as a result of the political 
movements of the 1960s, more attention was being paid to the condition of workers who 
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were not white males, and a series of laws were passed to ensure that they were not 
discriminated against in the workplace. Moreover, there were simply more women in the 
workforce in general, due in part to the women’s liberation movement, but also as part of 
a long, gradual trend that gained momentum after World War II.   
Outside of employment, social changes were rushing along as well. As a result of 
the civil rights, women’s liberation, and gay rights movements, white heterosexual men, 
some of whom had been in the vanguard of social movements earlier in the 1960s, were 
being called to account for their part in the oppression of white women, gay men, and 
nonwhite men and women. These social changes also appeared in the workplace, a center 
of male empowerment and protection, but an area that was beginning to crack under the 
weight of outside pressure. There began to appear female bartenders, bus drivers, and bill 
collectors, and more black men and white women were promoted to white-collar 
positions of power. They still remained largely an anomaly, but they existed, and could 
no longer be harassed out of the job. At a time of growing unemployment and change in 
established industries like automobile manufacturing and construction, white men also 
had to reconfigure their ideas of themselves. Who were they if they were unemployed? If 
they stayed home while their wife worked? If they were employed, but had to answer to a 
female boss? What was a white man in the 1970s, given the shifting circumstances of 
work and labor?   
This paper is about three things, as examined over the course of the 1970s: the 
changes in the state and dependability of work, the pressures of masculinity as felt by 
heterosexual white men over the age of 20 in the working and middle classes, and what 
occurred because of the relationship between work and that masculinity. To understand 
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the third, it is necessary to understand the first two, and what happened in both cases 
during the decade. Even disregarding the male-female dynamic in the increase in women 
at work, the state of employment changed in massive and permanent ways. Discussing 
work in combination with masculinity and expected social roles makes it more interesting 
because of the association between men and breadwinning, which was a key aspect of the 
male sex role predominant at the time. The discussion of these sex role assumptions led 
to the establishment of the men’s liberation movement, whose middle- and upper-middle-
class members examined the pressures they felt to be the sole earner for their families 
while their wives began to push for change.  
However, the changing economy most affected white men in the working class, 
who were less able to openly discuss the pressures they felt but were actively squeezed 
by the decline in traditional areas of employment and the increasing economic need for 
their wives to work. As low men – though not the lowest – on the economic totem pole, 
authority at home was supposed to make up for their lack of authority in work and 
society, but women leaving the home to work upended that, too. Combined with the 
social movements criticizing the white-male-dominated patriarchy, white working-class 
men felt threatened and attacked for circumstances over which they held no power, while 
their actual share of power was being eaten away. The men’s liberation movement 
suggested new ideals of masculinity, in which men could be more open with other 
people, and more able to express emotions. But by the end of the decade, an increasing 
sense of being unfairly attacked just for being white men became common among men of 
both classes, and many in and out of the men’s liberation movement began to reject the 
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idea that white masculinity and the structure of the patriarchy were in need of 
modification.  
This defensiveness was manifested in a transition in men’s liberation to a more 
anti-feminist men’s rights attitude; others turned to political conservatism. Ronald 
Reagan and his rhetoric of restoring American might capitalized on a feeling of 
vulnerable masculinity. In doing so, he persuaded the majority of white-male voters, 
especially those in the working class who had been loyal Democrats in previous decades, 
to vote Republican for the rest of the twentieth century. Both shifts in approach were an 
attempt by white men to hold onto what felt like an increasingly endangered authority: at 
work, at home, and in the nation overall.  
Nonwhite men will be discussed to some extent, but since much of the 
contemporaneous discussion about men’s issues in the 1970s referred solely to white 
men, this paper is thus focused on them. However, there still remains much to be said 
about black masculinity in the same period. Daniel P. Moynihan’s 1965 report, “The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action,” while bringing needed attention to an 
under examined populace, also essentially claimed that black families were often in 
poverty because black women were too strong-willed and black men were therefore 
emasculated. Black masculinity was being publicly questioned in a government report 
that continued to be cited as fact into the next decade. Not everyone agreed with 
Moynihan’s conclusions, and Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman, Michele 
Wallace’s 1978 political broadside/personal memoir, as Newsweek described it (Clemons 
78), instead described the problem as one of black men pitted against black women, who 
were hardly the “superwomen” black and white men both claimed them to be.  
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In addition, the issues of unemployment and providing for one’s family were 
much more central in the lives of black men and women, whose opportunities were fewer 
than those of white men and women, and whose unemployment rates were, as a 
consequence, always much higher. Black unemployment was often reported upon in 
newsweeklies, and the effects were discussed in greater detail in black interest magazines 
like Ebony and Essence. In short, despite the lack of attention paid to the issue by men’s 
issues writers in the 1970s, black masculinity of that period is as vital and fertile an issue 
of exploration as white masculinity, and I hope that study is not long in coming.  
Work 
“Work” and “masculinity” are both terms weighted with social and cultural 
assumptions, and it is useful, before proceeding, to explore further what is meant by 
them. “Work,” as noted by the members of the Special Task Force to the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare in their 1972 study Work in America, is “an activity that 
produces something of value for other people” (O'Toole, Hansot and Herman 3). Their 
definition includes housewives, who may work for free but who definitely produce 
something of value, but by “work” I refer to labor done outside the home for the purpose 
of financially supporting oneself and/or one’s family, as the focus of this paper is on the 
workers for whom home and work are discrete entities.  
Work informs all aspects of life: time, money, family, community, and personal 
image. It is, as the female company president noted above, a key determinant of identity, 
and it was, until the last half and especially last quarter of the twentieth century, a world 
largely inhabited by men. What a man did decided his and his family’s class standing, 
where and how he lived, where his children went to school, and with whom he and his 
6 
 
family associated. In short, a man’s work determined the “life style and life chances of all 
the family members” (O'Toole, Hansot and Herman 4). It gave a person a sense of his (or 
her) value, both personally and in society: if, according to the logic of the wage-labor 
market, his skills are valuable, he has value; if not, he does not, or at least may see 
himself that way. 
Work also leads to the creation of a distinct environment and culture of a 
workplace, in which disparate people brought together in a hierarchy to do a particular 
job establish their own vocabulary and rapport (or lack thereof). An individual’s 
experiences at and feeling about work can carry over to his or her home life and vice 
versa, so that while the two worlds are generally kept separate, what happens in one will 
affect the other: 
The more a man is integrated into the economic opportunity structure (as 
measured objectively by his occupational status, education and income and 
subjectively by his alienation or lack of alienation) the greater the cohesiveness 
of the family and of satisfaction with the husband-wife relationship…. Lack of 
integration, however, may cause the displacement of economic discontents onto 
personal relations. (John Scanzoni, cited in Kanter 14) 
 
The primacy of work as a determining factor of so many aspects of modern life 
would be interesting to study alongside the expectations and actions of men even without 
the added socially- and self-imposed pressure American men felt (and to a large degree 
still feel) to be “the breadwinner,” the sole provider of their family’s financial stability. 
For so long, men had been taught to expect to work to provide for themselves and their 
families, that it was something they were uniquely qualified for in a way women were 
not. The provider role came as part of an informal bargain, “a kind of cultural bribe” 
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(Tolson 46), struck between a husband and a wife: in exchange for working in an 
unsatisfying and potentially dehumanizing job, the worker gets to do what he will with 
his leisure time, and is respected as the head of his household by his wife and children. 
This bargain has to be upheld by both sides; should the man fail to find or keep a job, he 
is not guaranteed to be obeyed at home. The contract aspect of it is what critics of the 
women’s movement pointed to as evidence that women were not oppressed by gender 
norms, but that failed to take into account the fact that often the contract only went one 
way, and that women were not always able to amend its stipulations (Sennett and Cobb 
126-129; Rubin 95-97). 
Where did this pressure come from? Prior to industrialization, when work was 
more craft-based and autonomous, artisans would sometimes utilize their wives and 
children in some of the easier tasks involved in production of goods like shoes or textiles, 
and homes were often where that work would occur. Physical strength was necessary for 
some of the work, especially in agriculture, which employed the bulk of American men 
earlier in the nineteenth century (Kimmel 60). But as factories came to replace individual 
craftsmanship and hire away many farmers, work and home became much more separate 
(Rotundo 23-24; Kimmel 39-40). This division of work and home was also true for 
middle-class workers, as many moved out to the newly-established suburbs once easy 
access to city centers became common. Work, and this was true of both white- and blue-
collar occupations, turned into a male-only space that generally neither welcomed women 
nor considered them to have the skills necessary to work in the rough world of business 
or manual labor (Rotundo 174-176). 
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For laborers, the work itself became much less about personal skill and much 
more about simple repetition, especially with the development of the mass production 
line devised by Henry Ford to produce his Model T car as quickly and cheaply as 
possible in the early twentieth century. The work in some industries was basic enough 
that many employers took advantage of cheaper female labor, such as in the textile mills 
of Lawrence, Massachusetts. The female workers tended to be young and single, often 
leaving the workforce upon marriage, and were usually given the lowest-paying, lowest-
skilled jobs, as the more skilled work was saved for men.  
Joshua Freeman notes in “Hardhats: Construction Workers, Manliness, and the 
1970 Pro-War Demonstrations” that by the late nineteenth century, “physical strength and 
specific craft skills became less important in working-class male identity, while the 
ability of a worker to provide for his family became more so” (Freeman 727). As work 
itself became less challenging, men were no longer able to pride themselves on their 
skills. Other losses in the nineteenth century included a reduction in independent farms 
and small businesses concurrent with the rise in conglomerated companies whose 
factories hired away the workers who would otherwise work in those businesses (Kimmel 
61-62). No longer would most men be able to physically own and pass down to their son 
land, business, or skills. Instead, they turned their ability to feed their families into the 
challenge and goal of their working lives, which was later incorporated into union 
struggles for better wages and benefits. If the job was not going to improve, at least life 
outside the job would be better. 
This goal was also defined by the fact that their wives were not to work, or if so, 
only as supplementary income. Indeed, the ability to support a family on one income, the 
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so-called “family wage,” was seen as a major determinant of higher status, especially for 
the working class. Discussing the reaction of nineteenth-century laborers to 
industrialization, Peter Stearns noted the “pervasive belief, lasting well into the [twentieth 
century], that the man had failed whose wife had to seek employment outside the house” 
(Stearns 45). By the 1970s, when many working-class wives had to go to work for 
economic reasons, the feeling of having failed if unable to earn enough on one’s own still 
affected many men in the working class: 
Despite the enormity of the burdens they carry, many men still feel they must do 
it alone if they are to fulfill their roles successfully. Often they cannot, as the 
soaring proportion of married women who work attests. For the working-class 
man, that often means yet another challenge to his already uncertain self-esteem 
– this time in the only place where he has been able to make his authority felt: the 
family. (Rubin 183-184) 
Wives in the middle class, whose husbands earned more than their working-class 
counterparts, paid closer attention to how that income level could be expressed through 
fashion and consumer goods, a practice the working class would not widely pick up until 
the postwar boom of the 1950s and 1960s when the price of expensive consumer goods 
came down while the availability of consumer credit rose. But as prices rose while wages 
stagnated, even middle-class wives got a job. As the twentieth century marched 
inexorably toward the twenty-first, women kept on entering the world of work, beyond 
the low-skilled drudge jobs men did not want anyway. So if women could be executives 
or welders, and men no longer had to be the sole breadwinner, where else could a man 
look to define himself?  
These questions were taken up during the 1970s by the growing field of men’s 
studies, initially expressed by men’s liberation writers, who began to examine the 
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evolution of Western attitudes about men and work. At the same time, the subject of 
work in and of itself was a popular topic among a variety of writers, including journalists, 
psychologists, sociologists, and government-appointed researchers, as much that had 
been taken for granted in the postwar boom years was proving to be unreliable, and the 
world of work was changing. Worker alienation in particular proved to be a fertile topic, 
and many writers and researchers concluded that it resulted from much blue-collar work 
having deteriorated into mindlessly repetitive, disconnected tasks that failed to engage the 
mind while also producing little of immediate value. As one steelworker put it, “[i]t’s 
hard to take pride in a bridge you’re never gonna (sic) cross, in a door you’re never gonna 
open. You’re mass-producing things and you never see the end result of it” (Mike 
Lefevre, quoted in Terkel xxxi). 
One such study, Worlds of Pain (1976) by sociologist Lillian Rubin, 
acknowledged that though there were still elite blue-collar jobs, like skilled construction 
workers, truck drivers, and other work that required skills and provided some autonomy, 
there were fewer of those all the time: 
[M]ost blue-collar men work at jobs that require less skill, that have less room for 
independent judgment – indeed, often expect that it will be suspended – and that 
leave their occupants with little freedom or autonomy. Such jobs have few 
intrinsic rewards and little status – either in the blue-collar world or the one 
outside – and offer few possibilities for experiencing oneself as a “good man.” 
(Rubin 158) 
The Hidden Injuries of Class (1972), by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, made a 
similar observation of many white-collar workers, especially those who had been raised 
in blue-collar families. Ambivalence about changing status was increased by a feeling 
that “pushing papers” was not real work compared to making something, even if the 
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workers making that thing did not feel they were doing much, either (Sennett and Cobb 
21). “Pushing papers” could be as repetitive and mindless as manual work, and getting 
paid more for it did not always satisfy the nagging feeling of not feeling connected to 
your work, not having something to point to that you created. Though research was done 
and recommendations made, little was done over the course of the 1970s to improve the 
problem of worker alienation. 
Along with worker alienation came stagnation in productivity, the engine that had 
propelled the boom years of the 1950s and 1960s. As productivity fell, the costs of 
business rose, especially when compared to the bustling economies of West Germany and 
Japan which began to fill the productivity gap. As a result, American corporations 
increased the pace of automation in factory work and began closing factories in the 
Northeast and Midwest and opening them in cheaper areas in the South and West or 
outsourcing the work to supplier firms. Once cheaper labor markets emerged in other 
countries, multinational companies closed factories in the U.S. and sent the work to their 
international factories in what was known as “offshoring” (Lee and Mather 14-15). This 
process came to be known as “deindustrialization” in the popular lexicon from a 1982 
study The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, 
and the Dismantling of Basic Industry by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison. They 
found that “[b]etween thirty-two and thirty-eight million jobs disappeared during the 
1970s as the direct result of private disinvestment or relocation of U.S. businesses” 
(emphasis his, Bluestone in Cowie and Heathcott ix), a process that is still continuing. 
Between 1973 and 2007, the proportion of nonfarm workers in manufacturing in the U.S. 
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fell from 24% to 10%, while workers in the service sector increased from 70% to 83% 
over the same period (Lee and Mather 7). 
Another change in work was the greater number of female employees. More 
women were in the workforce by the end of the 1970s than ever before in American 
history, and there were more couples with two earners than one, a phenomenon that first 
occurred only in 1978 (Westcott and Bednarzik 11). The expectation that women could 
and would work after marriage became normalized in this decade. However, despite the 
increase of women and non-white men in higher-skilled and higher-ranked work, the 
majority of those better-paying jobs were still filled by white men.  
Masculinity 
 As the historian Gail Bederman puts it, “To study the history of manhood . . . is to 
study the historical ways different ideologies about manhood develop, change, are 
combined, amended, contested – and gain the status of truth” (quoted in Traister 274). 
Masculinity refers to the collection of social pressures that have come to equal “man” – 
to be thought of as a man in a particular setting, one must follow certain rules. But these 
rules and expectations change over time for a variety of reasons, and their fluidity 
exposes their subjectivity and arbitrariness. Studying masculinity means identifying the 
elements of maleness as they appear at a particular time, and then tracing the origins of 
those elements. Often, this exposes the fact that an ideology of masculinity is based on 
out-of-date social and economic circumstances, and the emergence of new and 
unprecedented conditions can throw traditional ideals into disarray. The internal clash 
within men at such times has proven to be fertile ground for scholars of men’s studies, 
who explore the trends in masculinities from several perspectives. 
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One of the more influential studies in the current field was Judith Butler’s 
discussion of feminist and queer identity, Gender Trouble (1990). Her work had a 
galvanizing impact on men’s studies by suggesting that masculinity, like femininity, was 
an external performance of qualities and behaviors required by social norms in order for a 
person to be perceived as fitting into whatever gender type he or she identified with. If 
one has to perform like a man to be seen as a man, what does it actually mean to be a 
man? Is manhood measured against other men by what one is, or is it measured against 
women, what one is not? Or is it both? If every quality and behavior occurs because of a 
conscious or unconscious decision to do so, is identity anything but performance? I am 
inclined to think that identity is a performance, but one in which most people do not 
realize they have agreed to participate. 
 The tenuousness of the performance is made most obvious when it is threatened. 
Much of the recent work on masculinity has focused on periods of “crisis,” when 
established norms were in question and the resulting disruption often led to the adaptation 
and reaffirmation of male dominance, though the term “crisis” in relation to masculinity 
was used even in 1970, in Karl Bednarik’s book The Male in Crisis. Often, the shifts in 
social norms have been attributed to major social and economic changes such as 
urbanization and industrialization, when the unspoken rules of class, race, and gender 
were upended and the old answers did not fit the new questions. 
To look at the work done on masculinity in the last twenty years is to observe that 
American men have been in an apparently never-ending series of crises throughout the 
twentieth century. In a review essay of three monographs written in the late 1990s, Judith 
A. Allen notes that all three share a sense that “[i]nherently unstable, masculinity is 
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always in process, under negotiation, needing to be ‘shored up,’ reinforced, buttressed 
against its many enemies” (Allen 199).1 Bryce Traister, in an analysis of the subfield of 
“heteromasculinity studies,” in which this paper should be categorized, locates the “crisis 
theory” partly in Butler’s influence and partly in the recent burst of works done in the 
field itself. The crisis theme is so popular that it can seem as though the “history of 
American men as men now not only proceeds as a historiography of masculine crisis but 
collectively writes itself as an actual history of American masculinity as crisis” (emphasis 
his, Traister 287). In other words, if masculinity is only made visible when it is in 
conflict, then the best way to truly examine the history of American men is through a 
series of those conflicts. Only by discovering where the vulnerabilities are most obvious 
can we see what led to those vulnerabilities and what emerged from them to be later 
challenged in another crisis. 
 
As a reaction to the growth in women’s studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
writers in men’s studies began to observe that men were as susceptible to social pressures 
as women. Though there were several books written about men in the 1970s, some of 
which will be discussed in greater detail below, much of the conversation on men’s issues 
was done on a popular rather than academic level. Early academic men’s studies 
programs appeared in MIT and Temple University, but the academic field of men’s or 
“masculinity” studies gained more traction in the 1980s before emerging as a full-blown 
area of study in the 1990s with the publication of books such as Anthony Rotundo’s 
                                                          
1 Fighting for Manhood American: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-America and Philippine-
American Wars, Kristin Hoganson (1998); The Trials of Masculinity: Policing Sexual Boundaries, 1870-




American Manhood (1993), R.W. Connell’s Masculinities (1995), Gail Bederman’s 
Manliness and Civilization (1995), and Michael Kimmel’s Manhood in America (1996), 
which declared itself to be “a history of men as men,” rather than as the default (Kimmel 
1). “Gender studies,” a term originally used to mean women’s or queer studies, officially 
began to include men in those studies in the mid-1990s. 
 Can women write about manhood? Though Kimmel, for one, says no – they only 
see men’s history as “the drive for power, for domination, for control,” when manhood is 
really “more about the fear of others dominating us, having power or control over us” 
(Kimmel 5)2 – many female scholars have ignored this opinion. An informal survey of 
the works referenced in a 2005 review of the field of men’s studies by Robert Nye shows 
that of the authors of works published between the years 2000 and 2003, forty are women 
and forty-four are men. The explosion of the field in the last twenty years has proved 
equally fertile for both men and women. Despite Kimmel’s assertion that women cannot 
possibly understand “us,” perhaps it is more useful to be outside the direct influence of 
social pressures when describing how those pressures affect men.  
Of those writers who are male, however, Traister notes that many insert 
themselves into their work, adopting the feminist trope that “the personal is professional 
is political.” In American Manhood, Anthony Rotundo says that “[a]s I have written this 
book, I have been more aware of my inner discord on issues of manhood than of my inner 
coherence” (quoted in Traister 279). David Leverenz, in Manhood and the American 
Renaissance, records his own reactions to the male-authored texts he discusses and in 
                                                          
2 Although if this is true, how can any man permit himself to work, given that most will be professionally 
dominated by their boss? 
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doing so, as Traister puts it, “[t]he manhood of Leverenz’s nineteenth-century American 
renaissance . . . looks a lot like his own confessed struggles with masculinity” (Traister 
280). Writing about historical masculinity often seems to bring up questions for male 
writers about what it is now, true of writers in the 1970s as in the present era. In 1985, 
Tim Carrigan, Bob Connell, and John Lee, three Australian scholars reviewing the 
previous decade’s discussion of masculinity, noticed a similar trend: 
The autobiographical sketches that peppered the 1970s books-about-men 
regularly remarked how the author had been taught the conventional male role, 
found it hard to inhabit, and eventually discovered the trouble was not in him but 
in the role. (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 565) 
One such writer, Peter Stearns, wrote in 1979 that though he did not always feel 
particularly manly, Be a Man! Males in Modern Society was “not a shy boy’s revenge 
against he-men, a kick of verbal sand at Charles Atlas,” and that there was “no search 
here for villainesses,” that is to say, feminists (Stearns 9). His self-conscious defense only 
points out further that in writing about the historical traditions that have led to the 
existing standards of male behavior, it is hard for male authors – who were themselves 
engaged in scholarly writing, something generally not considered especially manly – not 
to examine themselves.   
 Nye observes that one reason for the increased attention paid in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries to the malleability of sex and the self-identification of gender is due 
to the improvements over the last half-century in surgery and synthetic hormones: 
These developments have divided sex, gender, and sexuality into separate 
ontological and analytical categories and have produced the situation in which 
gender, as the more stable feature of personal and social identity, has begun to 
replace sex as the common descriptor in everyday discourse for women and men, 
male and female. (Nye 1938) 
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The biological and psychological science of sex has removed a lot of the mystery that 
doctors and social scientists previously ascribed to “masculinity” and “femininity,” and 
as more work is done in the “putting on” of sex roles, the idea that anything can be 
assumed about a person (including what pronoun to use) just by what gender he or she 
appears to be is becoming increasingly invalidated. And in that new space historians, 
sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural scholars work to further explore what can be 
revealed through studying masculinity. 
 The study of masculinity in the 1970s is particularly interesting because not only 
was it a period of crisis, in which standards of manhood were put to the test, it marked the 
beginning of the conversation about those standards, and the realization that ideals of true 
masculinity were never as concrete as they may have seemed. The idea of gender 
standards as socially imposed rather than innately natural had come up before – Traister 
cites as a predecessor of the field Leslie A. Fiedler’s Love and Death in the American 
Novel (1960), a groundbreaking study of the unexamined sexual and racial overtones in 
classic American novels such as The Scarlet Letter and Huckleberry Finn, and through 
the late 1950s and into the 1960s sociologists studied “masculinity” as it applied to 
groups like juvenile delinquents, especially focusing on the effects on a man of growing 
up without a father (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 560) – but discussion in the 1970s was 
important because it came at a time when these socially imposed standards of masculinity 
were again being threatened, especially in the workforce, for the first time since the end 
of WWII. The postwar boom introduced a society of affluence in which the economy was 
assumed to have become predictable and manageable so social issues could be dealt with 
more fully. Unions had won important gains in wage and benefit packages, based on the 
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assumption that the economy would continue to improve. Yet in reality, political 
management of the economy proved illusory, and social problems became exacerbated by 
a declining economy. The country changed in several key ways that affected how white 
men saw themselves, and it was not by accident that the movement that led to men’s 
studies began in the 1970s.  
Current Discussion 
 Over the last decade, the 1970s have become a popular subject of discussion. 
Many events of recent years – the 2008 financial crisis, the perilous position of public 
and private unions, various issues related to energy and oil consumption, growing 
economic inequality between the rich and everybody else – can be traced back to 
decisions made and not made in the 1970s. Writers have begun to examine the period 
from a variety of perspectives: economic (Pivotal Decade, by Judith Stein, 2010), 
intellectual (Age of Fracture, by Daniel T. Rodgers, 2011), political (Suburban Warriors, 
Lisa McGirr, 2001; Rightward Bound, by Bruce Schulman and Julian Zelizer (eds.), 
2008; Stayin’ Alive, by Jefferson Cowie, 2010; Right Star Rising, by Laura Kalman, 
2010), and social (How We Got Here, by David Frum, 2000; The Seventies, by Bruce 
Schulman, 2002; America in the Seventies, by Beth Bailey and David Farber (eds.), 2004; 
Something Happened, by Edward Berkowitz, 2007; No Direction Home, by Natasha 
Zaretsky, 2007; Decade of Nightmares, by Philip Jenkins, 2008). Some books have 
focused on particular years or events: Taken Hostage, by David Farber, 2006; 1973 
Nervous Breakdown, by Andreas Killen, 2007; What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. 
President?, by Kevin Mattson, 2009.  
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The rightward political shift in the U.S. is a popular topic in most narratives of the 
decade, as the economic policies of the Republican-controlled federal government in the 
1980s are largely responsible for much of the economic situation today. McGirr traces the 
rise of the conservative and religious right in Orange County, CA, and notes that the 
passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, a state regulation imposing a cap on property taxes, 
was directly responsible for the county’s bankruptcy in 1994 (McGirr 270). Stein and 
Harvey trace the economic changes caused by the New Right and their disastrous effects 
on the national economy, while Rodgers examines the shift in rhetoric between Carter 
and Reagan as well as the political and social reconceptualization and renegotiation of 
some of the many “ideas in motion” (Rodgers 13) in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century.  
However, despite the victories won in the 1980s by the more conservative 
Republican party, Kalman’s political history shows that in many ways, the election of 
Ronald Reagan in 1980 came more from strong anti-Carter and anti-liberal feeling than 
because of some larger rightward shift. Though the U.S. of the 1980s was undoubtedly 
more conservative than that of the 1970s, it was not a foregone conclusion in 1972 or 
1976 that a conservative Republican would be elected in 1980, however otherwise the 
narrative was later recast by Republicans. One such reviser was former George W. Bush 
speechwriter David Frum, who claimed that the 1970s were a period of national doubt 
and insecurity – what New West magazine declared to be “a Pinto of a decade,” referring 
to Ford Motor Company’s subcompact car noted for its occasionally faulty engineering 
and unattractive appearance (quoted in Mattson 199), and, indeed, no author refers to the 
decade as an unqualified success – that could only have been restored by the triumphant 
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1980s. His is a rare note of victory; more in line with the overall tone of most writers, 
Mattson asks, replying in part to Frum’s assertion, that if 1979 was indeed a turning 
point, did the country make the best turn?  
 Masculinity, a topic so broad as to include discussion of international and historic 
issues as well as film studies, anthropology, politics, music, theater, and parenting, 
continues as a popular subject of books. In 2011 alone, books have already been or will 
soon be published with titles such as Contemporary Hollywood Masculinities, by 
Suzanne Kord and Elisabeth Krimmer, a study of masculinity in American film during 
the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; ‘Manufactured’ Masculinity, by J.A. 
Mangan, about British imperial standards of masculinity; Cow Boys and Cattle Men, by 
Jacqueline Moore, about white men in Texas, 1865 to 1900; From Jim Crow to Jay-Z, by 
Miles White, about the performance of race and masculinity in rap music; David Mamet 
and American Macho, by Arthur Holmberg, about the playwright’s male characters; and 
Making It Like a Man, by Christine Ramsay, a study of Canadian masculinity. 
Interestingly, an anthology examining the uses of men’s studies itself will also be 
published in 2011, Masculine Lessons: Rethinking Men’s and Women’s Studies, by James 
Catano and Daniel Novak (eds.).  
Another interesting release, though not one about masculinity, is a self-help book 
called For Women Only in the Workplace: What You Need to Know About How Men 
Think At Work, by Shaunti Feldhahn, that claims to help Christian businesswomen 
succeed at work by understanding the male rules. Feldhahn explains that she wrote this 
book to help her readers better understand the “male expectations and perceptions” that 
affect their workplace:  
21 
 
[E]ven as smart, experienced women, we can find ourselves being tripped up by 
obstacles we don’t know are there. Or perhaps we simply aren’t as influential as 
we could be, or aren’t experiencing the rewarding, positive relationships that all 
of us want in the workplace. Based on my nationwide surveys and interviews 
with thousands of men, I can tell you that those dynamics are far more common 
that most women realize. (Feldhahn 2) 
What is fascinating about Feldhahn’s book and other self-help titles purporting to teach 
women the ins and outs of business is that they show how unchanged the world of work 
really is, despite the consistent presence of women for the past thirty years.3 Though 
there was some discussion in the 1970s about bringing more “feminine” characteristics, 
such as “sensitivity to people [and] compassion” (Professor Don Jewell, quoted in U.S. 
News and World Report 12/8/75 62), into the workplace, that simply failed to occur on a 
wide scale, and indeed, sometimes the people who most discourage the feminization of 
work are female executives themselves. In a recent New Yorker profile, Sheryl Sandberg, 
the Chief Operations Officer of Facebook, whose mentor at Harvard University and 
beyond was a man who worked for multiple presidential administrations as a high-
ranking economist, spoke disparagingly about what she called “girl questions,” such as 
how to find a mentor (Auletta 60). Asking “girl questions” distracted from the business of 
doing business; women, she felt, did not need special treatment, just to be assertive. As 
Urie Bronfenbrenner noted disapprovingly in 1976, “we have left the world of work 
defined in male terms” (Huber and Bronfenbrenner 48), and it is evidently no different 
now than it was then.   
                                                          
3 For example: Play Like a Man, Win Like a Woman: What Men Know About Success That Women Need to 
Learn, Gail Events (2001); Seducing the Boys Club: Uncensored Tactics from a Woman at the Top, Nina 
DiSesa (2008); Nice Women Don’t Get the Corner Office: 101 Unconscious Mistakes Women Make That 
Sabotage Their Careers, Lois P. Frankel (2010). 
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 Though many monographs discuss some aspect of work in their examinations of 
masculinity, more specific connections between masculinity and work can often be found 
in essays such as “The Influence of Parenthood on the Work Effort of Married Men and 
Women,” by Gayle Kaufman and Peter Uhlenberg, 2000; “Contracting Masculinity: 
Gender, Class and Race in a White-Collar Union, 1944-1994,” by Gillian Creese, 2000; 
“‘Why Marcia, You’ve Changed!’ Male Clerical Temporary Workers Doing Masculinity 
in a Feminized Occupation,” by Kevin Henson and Jackie Krasas Rogers, 2001; “By 
Necessity or By Right: The Language and Experience of Gender at Work,” by Nancy 
Christie, 2002; and “What Happens to Potential Discouraged? Masculine Norms and the 
Contrasting Institutional and Labor Market Experiences of Less Affluent Black and 
White Men,” by Deirdre Royster, 2007. The 2001 anthology Boys and Their Toys? 
Masculinity, Technology, and Class in America looks closely at many aspects of 
masculinity as it ties into the workplace. But so far little has been done recently 
specifically on men in the 1970s. 
 
Economic and social shifts of the 1970s, especially deindustrialization, the 
increase of women in the workforce, and a stagnating economy, upended traditional ideas 
of white middle-class and working-class manhood and led many men to a more 
conservative outlook. In The Neglected Voter, a 2008 study of white male voters’ 
transition from a Democrat to Republican bloc in the second half of the twentieth 
century, David Paul Kuhn traces the “problem of the rejected man” in terms of white 
men’s social alienation from their traditional party (Kuhn 8). Though the political aspect 
of the shift in thinking among white men is important and will be discussed, I also 
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examine that alienation in more social terms, as among middle-class men who began to 
reject feminism without necessarily becoming Republicans. This conservative shift had 
and still has a significant political and social effect on the country, continuing to retard 
true equality between white men and everyone else. In the 1970s, a time when the 
negative effects of the patriarchal system were made so obvious – through the blatant 
disregard of businesses for their workers, the shunting of women employees into low-
paying and low-status work, and the introduction of economic policies that would 
increase the financial success of the wealthy at the expense of the rest of the country – 
why did so many white men in both classes decide, consciously or not, to support that 
system by opposing greater equality? I contend that as the demographic group with the 
most economic, social, and political power, even if it felt otherwise at the time, they had 
no incentive to give it up, and indeed, a strong desire to maintain it.  
The first chapter of this work looks at changes in work and society from 1970 to 
1980. The Department of Labor’s Monthly Labor Review, which reports and analyzes 
employment data for the country, was used as a source of contemporary employment 
information. In addition, I looked at some of the decade’s many books about work, 
including the government study Work in America, Worlds of Pain by Lillian Rubin, and 
The Hidden Injuries of Class by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb. Secondary sources 
include Right Star Rising by Laura Kalman, Suburban Warriors by Lisa McGirr, Pivotal 
Decade by Judith Stein, and several others.  
The second chapter examines employment and the language of masculinity as 
used in the media, as well as journalism’s discussions of masculinity itself. Primary 
sources are largely magazine articles of the period, representing a spectrum of viewpoints 
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and opinions, from the newsweeklies U.S. News and World Report, Time, and Newsweek 
to more specialized periodicals such as Ladies’ Home Journal, Esquire, Intellect, 
Commonweal, and Reader’s Digest, among many others.  
The third chapter surveys the men’s liberation movement and the field of 
masculinity studies as exemplified by a selection of the books written on “men’s lib” over 
the course of the decade, such as Men’s Liberation by John Nichols, Men and 
Masculinity by Joseph Pleck and Jack Sawyer (editors), The Liberated Man by Warren 
Farrell, and others. I conclude with a look at the similarities between that decade and this 




Chapter 1: Changes in the World of the White American Man 
 
Over the course of the 1970s, the cost of living increased while the availability of 
work for white men decreased. Though white men in general remained better off than any 
other group in terms of employment, the increased participation of women combined 
with a shift from a manufacturing-based to a services-based economy meant that overall, 
white men’s share of the job market fell. Combined with a rate of inflation that made 
everything more expensive, men could no longer assume that their income would be 
enough to support a family, one of the foundations of traditional American manhood. 
This chapter shows the many economic and political changes that occurred during the 
decade, and the origin of the feeling of threatened manhood. By understanding the 
historical context of the period, we can better understand why white men felt the world 
was to some degree leaving them behind. 
Employment by the Numbers  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ yearly reports show that over the course of the 
1970s, blue-collar jobs shrunk in absolute terms. However, white men still remained 
better off in terms of work and unemployment than any other demographic group, even 
as their proportion of the workforce slowly declined. The unemployment rate of white 
men never went above 6.2%, even in 1975, when the 1970s economy was at its worst and 
the national average unemployment rate was 8.5% (and 11.7% for black men) (Green, 
Devens and Whitmore 16). But that was poor comfort to those who were unemployed or 
whose work environment was changing. 
The 1970s began on the crest of the surge in employment of the 1960s. The 
prewar macroeconomic principles of British economist John Maynard Keynes, or 
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Keynesianism, promoted government intervention and stimulus of the economy. When 
combined with a strong postwar economy based on international trade and domestic 
consumption, the result was an economic boom that both steadily increased the standard 
of living while establishing the U.S. as the world’s primary financial power. However, 
the boom was not felt uniformly across the country, and though wage increases became 
standard among unionized laborers, factories began closing in the older, established 
industrialized cities in the Northeast and Midwest, and reopening in the less-unionized 
and therefore less expensive cities in the South. The abandonment of older factories in 
favor of new ones elsewhere was also encouraged by federal tax laws that allowed for a 
tax deduction of losses incurred from doing so. Only strong labor resistance prevented 
this from happening as often as big corporations, like U.S. Steel, would have liked (Brill 
138).  
At the same time, fighting the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War seemed to necessitate a 
federal budget that spent a lot on defense, and the new industries of military technology 
were built largely through government funding. The “military-industrial complex” 
President Eisenhower warned about in his final speech as president in 1961 made 
Southern California into a booming, bustling area of development, the promised land of 
postwar America, while previously lively cities like Detroit slowly deteriorated (McGirr 
45).  The affluence of Southern California and the West in general was largely due to 
wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the ongoing arms race against the U.S.S.R.; as 
Eisenhower pointed out, if fighting wars becomes a business, then wars must regularly be 
fought in order for that business to continue. Businesses built on the horrors of war were 
neither morally nor financially sustainable, as would become obvious in the 1970s after 
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Vietnam. Moreover, not everyone was able to fully participate in that affluence without 
further prodding from the federal government. The postwar boom was, in other words, of 
dubious social merit. 
The employment boom of the 1960s peaked in mid-1970 before beginning to 
recede. Unemployment leveled off in the third quarter of 1970 but the United Automobile 
Workers’ strike against General Motors Corporation complicated the issue and 
unemployment rose again, mostly due to secondary effects of the strike in industries that 
built car parts. Anything that affected the automobile industry affected the economy at 
large, as workers in the automobile and related industries made up one out of every 
twelve manufacturing employees in the United States (Stein 252).  Drops in employment 
in the first half of 1970 were seen in largely male-dominated fields, such as aerospace 
and defense, which were beginning to feel the effects of the slowdown in the Vietnam 
War; durable goods manufacturing, including industries affected by the decline in 
aerospace and defense; and construction. The Pentagon let go about 400,000 military and 
another 100,000 civilian employees, while another almost 400,000 were laid off in 
defense-related companies, a big shock for an industry that only two years earlier had 
been booming (Businessweek 9/5/70 66). This caused the first increase in unemployment 
for men since 1962, especially blue-collar men over 25, whose unemployment rate rose 
from 3.9% in 1969 to 6.2% just a year later (Flaim and Schwab 18). The overall 
unemployment rate of white men, however, was 3.2% (Green and Stinson 23). 
 There was some recovery in 1971, especially in the fields of trade, services, and 
government work, but unemployment remained at around 6% the entire year (Green and 
Stinson 20). Most job losses were felt by adult men in the goods-producing industries, 
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especially those involved in the defense and aerospace industries, which, unusually, 
affected the nonproduction, white-collar jobs as much as the blue-collar. Other 
nonproduction jobs were lost due to employers cutting costs by trimming nonessential 
workers. As a result of these and other trends, professional white-collar unemployment 
increased almost a full percentage point to 2.9%, the highest level ever recorded up to 
that time, and white-collar unemployment in general increased significantly from 2.8% in 
1970 to 3.5% (Green and Stinson 25). What job increases existed did not extend to black 
workers, whose unemployment level increased slightly to 9.9%, the highest since 1963 
(Green and Stinson 26).  
Though the economy improved greatly over the course of 1972 and an average of 
about 2.3 million jobs were created, the introduction of about 2.1 million new workers 
into the workforce failed to lower the unemployment rate as much as it otherwise might 
have. In addition, the length of unemployment was steadily increasing, and much of the 
long-term unemployed (27 weeks or more) were adult males who had previously held 
manufacturing jobs (Businessweek 6/12/71 24). Continuing the tradition of recent years, 
the workforce expansion included women, teenagers, and returning veterans of the 
Vietnam War. All demographic groups did well in the recovery, especially white adult 
men (aged 20 and older), the group that saw “the largest year-to-year job pickup in 
twenty-five years” with about one million jobs, almost 50% of the year’s new positions, 
and this group’s unemployment rate decreased to 3.6% (Green and Stinson 24).  
The expansion that had begun in 1971 culminated in 1973 with an increase in 
employment of 2.7 million workers, “the largest year-to-year increase since 1955” 
(Gilroy and Bradshaw 3). The labor force rose 2.1 million, due mostly to an increase in 
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the population of men and women ages 20-24, baby boomers reaching work age. Both 
white- and blue-collar industries gained jobs, though for the first time since the end of 
WWII wages ceased to follow the pattern of regular growth and began to stagnate even as 
inflation caused the cost of living to continue increasing (Stein xi). White-collar science 
and engineering occupations began to rebound from the cutbacks in defense and 
aerospace that began in 1969, though manufacturing jobs in companies that had produced 
goods for the defense and aerospace industries failed to return to the highs of the Vietnam 
War period, an example of the white-collarization of these particular industries. Blue-
collar unemployment fell to 5.3%, the lowest since 1970. The unemployment rate of 
white men decreased significantly to 2.9%. General unemployment hit a low of 4.7%, but 
began to rise as the year ended, due to the stock market crash in late 1973, and the 
retaliatory oil embargo imposed by some of the members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that began in October as a consequence of 
American aid to Israel in the Yom Kippur War against Syria and Egypt, both of which 
boded poorly for the years to come.  
 1974 saw the beginning of the real economic woes of the 1970s. High interest 
rates combined with a shortage of mortgage funds led to the worst housing crisis since 
World War II, which, combined with a downturn in nonresidential construction, 
prompted a dramatic rise in the unemployment rate of construction workers, from 8.8% 
in 1973 to 13.7% in 1974 (Flaim, Bradshaw and Gilroy 4). The energy crisis of 1973 
continued to negatively affect automobile and related manufacturing industries. As a 
result of the downturns in construction and manufacturing, the jobless rate skyrocketed, 
from 4.1% in Fall 1973 to 7.1% in December 1974 (Flaim, Bradshaw and Gilroy 3), for a 
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total of 18.3 million people, an increase of four million over 1973 (Young 47). “One-
third of all construction workers and one-fifth of workers in durable and nondurable 
manufacturing were unemployed at some time during the year, much larger proportions 
than in 1973” (Young 49). The continued rise in inflation led to a steady decline in real 
personal disposable income, which hurt the retail industry. The downturn, however, was 
much less severe in white-collar work.  
 The recession that had begun in 1973 led to “the worst economic contraction 
since the Great Depression” in 1975, and with it came a great increase in unemployment 
that was “particularly severe among adult men” (St. Marie and Bednarzik 11). Between 
mid-year 1974 and mid-year 1975, adult males lost 1.3 million jobs, especially blue-
collar work. Unemployment for white adult males hit a decade high of 6.2% (Green, 
Devens and Whitmore 16). Unemployment in general peaked at 8.5% for the year, the 
highest level recorded anytime post-WWII, and unemployment benefits were claimed by 
about 75% of the unemployed (Bednarzik and St. Marie 10). There was slight recovery at 
the end of the year, but not enough to return to pre-recession levels. As in 1974, the worst 
job losses were in manufacturing and construction, with white-collar work much less 
affected.  
In 1976, the economic recovery begun in 1975 continued, but overall 
unemployment still remained high, at one point hitting 8.0% (Bednarzik and St. Marie 3). 
What jobs were added benefited adult women over adult men, as white-collar work 
gained two million jobs whereas blue-collar gained only 850,000 (Bednarzik and St. 
Marie 3). Unemployment insurance remained a popular option for workers and was 
claimed by about 60% in 1976, down from 1975’s high of 75% (Bednarzik and St. Marie 
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10). The workforce continued to grow, due especially to an influx of adult women, and 
the proportion of adult men continued its decline. The unemployment rate of white men 
fell to 5.4% (Green, Devens and Whitmore 16). 
The post-recession expansion continued in 1977, with employment up in all 
groups and a decrease in the unemployment rate to an average of 7% (Green, Devens and 
Whitmore 12). Adult women, having become a third of the entire work force, accounted 
for about half of the 3.9 million jobs gained, and adult men, about 40%, while teenagers 
made up the rest (Green, Devens and Whitmore 12). However, adult men made up a 
larger proportion of the decline in joblessness, as the decline in unemployment for 
women was offset by an increase in working women. Any improvement in joblessness 
was limited to white workers, as black unemployment stagnated at around 13.1% (Green, 
Devens and Whitmore 16). Though black workers had better access to education and thus 
to better jobs, for the most part black workers were concentrated in unskilled laborer jobs, 
which were much more susceptible to cyclical joblessness. The country experienced 
greater post-recession recovery in 1976 and 1977 than in any other postwar recovery, 
which was largely due to the addition of around 1.4 million women a year. This also 
explained the high unemployment rate even in a recovery, as many of the jobless were 
first-time jobseekers “attracted to the labor force by increased employment opportunities” 
(Green, Devens and Whitmore 18).  
The job growth in 1978 amounted to 3.3 million new jobs, 60% of which went to 
female workers (Rones and Leon 3). Blue-collar jobs expanded strongly for the third 
consecutive year, especially in goods and crafts. Women benefited from the increase in 
crafts jobs as well as the white-collar increase in sales and clerical work. Mining and 
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construction, two industries whose workforce was principally male, both saw gains in 
employment, and the unemployment rate for the country fell to a four-year low, to 5.8% 
(Rones and Leon 3). The unemployment rate of white men decreased to 3.5%, though the 
percentage of couples with both members working increased for the first time to exceed 
that of one-worker couples, a trend that was to remain constant through the rest of the 
decade and into the 1980s (Rones and Leon 11). 
The great gains of 1976, 1977, and 1978 slowed down in 1979, as the labor force 
and employment rates both increased by two million, compared to three million or more 
in the previous years. The unemployment rate remained around 5.9% throughout the year 
(Leon and Rones 3). Growth was strongest in service-producing industries, largely 
concentrated in services, which accounted for about 75% of the new jobs, though the 
more blue-collar fields of construction and mining also posted strong employment gains; 
however, construction gains were limited to those working on long-term construction 
projects, as residential construction was deeply hurt by the economic slowdown, losing 
560,000 jobs by September 1979 (U.S. News and World Report 9/17/79 27). There were 
another 1.4 million working women in the workforce, who took most of the new white-
collar jobs (Rones and Leon 3). The unemployment rate of white men rose slightly to 
finish out the decade at 3.7% (Rones and Leon 8). 
The 1980s began with a recession. By the end of 1980, 1.3 million jobs had been 
lost, mostly in the goods-producing sector, and the unemployment rate had risen to 7.5%, 
about 8 million people, up from 6.1 million in 1979 (Westcott and Bednarzik 4). 
Compared to the recession of 1974-1975, which had been the worst of the postwar 
recessions, the recession of 1980 began the mildest, as job loss in blue-collar, goods-
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producing industries was made up for by job increases in the service-producing sector, 
particularly in professional and technical occupations. The worst of the recession was felt 
mainly in three specific industries: automobiles, construction, and steel, and related 
industries to a lesser extent, all of which were involved in the production of higher-end 
consumer products. Factory layoffs reached an all-time high of 35 layoffs per 1,000 
employees in the second quarter of 1980 before recovering somewhat (Westcott and 
Bednarzik 6). Due to this and other sharp increases in layoffs, the overall unemployment 
rate jumped 1.1% between the first and second quarters of 1980 (Westcott and Bednarzik 
8). By the end of the third quarter, male unemployment “actually exceeded that for adult 
women, a highly unusual labor market occurrence,” 6.6% to 6.4%, though it fell in the 
fourth quarter to under that of women, 6.3% to 6.7% (Westcott and Bednarzik 8).  Blue-
collar unemployment peaked at 11.1% while the effects of the recession were felt much 
less in white-collar occupations, though unemployment rates for both were still below 
1974-1975 levels (Westcott and Bednarzik 9). 
Economic Trends 
Though jobs are thought of in terms of personal and professional actions and 
relationships, employment is also political. The national state of employment is strongly 
affected by decisions made by the federal government, such as international trade 
agreements, efforts to stabilize the stock market, or programs designed to address various 
problems. One governmental influence on employment in the 1970s was the rate of so-
called “full employment,” a political term meant to indicate the acceptable level of 
unemployment that would prevent an “overfull” economy and subsequent increase in 
inflation. The rate of full employment had been inching up steadily since the 1950s, when 
a rate of 2-3% was deemed acceptable (Ulmer 14). Immediately following World War II, 
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full employment had been considered 1%; accordingly, the Employment Act of 1946 had 
originally been named the Full Employment Act, written with the Keynesian idea that 
employment was a right, and that the government should ensure that everyone who 
wanted a job should be able to find one (Ginsburg 114). But the business community 
strongly opposed what they felt were government regulations over business cycles that 
would address the issue anyway, and Congress, controlled by Republicans and Southern 
Democrats, pushed the bill into a compromise. Just as the word “full” was removed, so 
was the definition of “full employment” reconfigured to mean 2-3% unemployment 
rather than 1% or even 0% by giving different weight to different demographic groups of 
the unemployed to gain the desired result, a trick other politicians were later to use 
(Ulmer 14).   
Though, as Helen Ginsburg in The Nation put it, “[i]n a workforce of 92 million 
people, each percentage-point rise in joblessness tosses another 920,000 onto the scrap 
heap” (Ginsburg 116), John F. Kennedy’s administration moved the definition of “full 
employment” up to 4%, which held fairly steady until, during another period of 
increasing unemployment, Richard Nixon declared it to be 5% in 1971. Nixon 
administration officials, including Treasury Secretary John Connally and Chief Domestic 
Advisor John Erlichman, claimed that since only the unemployment rate of male heads-
of-household truly counted in terms of the negative effect of unemployment, the rate was 
itself somewhat inflated and should be reconsidered (Connally, quoted in Ginsburg 116; 
Erlichman, quoted in Time 10/9/72 76). This was a simplistic and insulting view of the 
issue as it related to millions of unemployed women, single men, and teenagers, and 
failed to take into account the “discouraged” or “hardcore” unemployed, those who had 
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given up looking for work and were not counted in the unemployment rate. Melvin 
Ulmer of The New Republic (1972) made a pointed observation on the politics of 
unemployment: 
[By 1976,] in time for the next presidential campaign, the true full employment 
rate of unemployment will be fixed at 15 per cent of the labor force. Had we only 
known this 40 years ago, we would have realized that 1932 was a year of 
unrecognized prosperity. (Ulmer 14) 
An attempt to amend the 1946 act, the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act, 
known officially as the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, was a Keynesian 
effort to reduce unemployment to 3% to 4% by 1983 and to authorize the government to 
help do so by providing a constant supply of public employment as needed. However, it 
was halfheartedly supported by President Carter and, as many of the more useful 
measures – consumer protection, welfare reform, hospital cost containment, and a simple 
national health insurance system – were cut from the bill by Senate conservatives, it 
failed to achieve its goal (Kalman 219-221).  
 
Through the years of increased unemployment, the administrations of Presidents 
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter made it clear that their priority was to combat inflation at 
the expense of the unemployment rate. Nixon’s attempts to lower unemployment in the 
early 1970s only helped in the short-term, and his conversion to Keynesianism after many 
years of criticizing the government spending of previous administrations made him seem 
unprepared for the realization that inflation and unemployment could both rise as the 
same time. The most popular Keynesian tool for predicting what the economy would do 
was the Phillips curve, an economic device that claimed a negative association between 
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unemployment and inflation. Originally devised in Britain, it was applied to American 
data in 1958, and turned into a macroeconomic tool in 1961 (Rodgers 48-49). In the 
period leading up to 1970, the Phillips curve seemed to adequately explain why the 
economy reacted as it did to various pressures, and provided politicians and economists 
with a fairly reliable way to predict the outcome of various measures. Unfortunately, its 
forecasting power began to break down in the 1970s.  
Inflation had begun its inexorable increase in the mid-1960s, as President Lyndon 
B. Johnson strained economic resources with the war in Vietnam and a series of 
expensive anti-poverty programs without also instituting a tax increase until the deficit 
necessitated one in 1968 (Stein 25). However, as the war in Vietnam and defense 
spending both began to wind down while the workforce grew in an unprecedented surge, 
inflation and unemployment started to rise at the same time. This resulted in the Nixon 
administration’s “extraordinary flailing” to regain some kind of control, in the form of 
wage and price controls that did help the economy recover in 1971 and 1972, but the 
removal of which made the situation worse in 1973 (Rodgers 48). Reimposition of the 
controls could not stop the recession that followed.  
By the mid-1970s, administration officials and leading economists, including 
Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President 
Ford, continued to insist that inflation was a threat larger than the growing proportion of 
unemployed men, women, and teenagers. Ford claimed inflation was “Public Enemy #1” 
(Businessweek 11/9/74 158), despite the public’s growing dissatisfaction with the 
direction the country was headed. He refused to “prime” the economic “pump” with 
public-works projects that would provide new jobs because, as he put it, “our country is 
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not in an economic crisis” (quoted in Kalman 46). Alas, the “Ford recession,” as it came 
to be called, worsened in 1975, and though the economy did improve in 1976, the 
unemployment rate did not, especially for blue-collar workers in what was becoming 
known as the “Rust Belt” of the Northeast and Midwest, where factories had shut down 
altogether. Not until 1980 did members of the Carter administration admit that the 
combination of unemployment and inflation was “unacceptable” (Byron 44), though by 
that point the country was in another recession. 
As the business community began to coalesce into a major lobbying force, they 
used their influence with the Ford administration in particular to promote inflation as the 
key enemy of a successful economy, while unemployment was reduced to a tool to fight 
inflation and recession. Especially as the recession worsened in 1974, some business 
leaders argued, with questionable math, that an economic stimulus to counter the rise in 
joblessness “would mean helping six percent of the population at the expense of the other 
94 percent.” They instead urged the “bitter medicine” of a short recession rather than 
running the risk of increased inflation (Businessweek 11/9/74 154). The business lobby 
would prove even more influential following a 1976 Supreme Court decision that allowed 
corporations to make unlimited donations to political parties and political action 
committees. Though Democrats now found themselves in a tricky position, relying on 
corporate donations yet still needing to satisfy their electoral base, the Republicans were 
much more comfortable with the alliance, and many of President Reagan’s “kitchen 
cabinet” members were high-ranked businessmen who wasted no time in achieving the 
repeal of almost forty percent of the 1970s laws that had benefited labor (Harvey 44-50). 
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A competing economic tool, the Laffer curve, arose to counter the failure of the 
Phillips curve and Keynesianism and claimed that a low tax rate, at exactly the right 
point, could provide the same level of government revenue as a higher rate, due to the 
increase in business capital such a low rate would supply. However, when it was put into 
practice in the Reagan administration, the Laffer curve proved unsound, and led to an 
increase in the deficit rather than the predicted surplus.  
 
Though unemployment was somewhat less painful than it had been in the past 
owing to an increase in private and federally funded unemployment benefits, the 
government’s failure to address the underlying issues in the rise of the unemployment 
rate – such as the disassembling of the country’s manufacturing industries as a result of 
foreign competition, domestic outsourcing, and offshoring; the alarming growth in 
teenage unemployment partly due to a rise in the minimum wage; and the training gap 
between those looking for work and the skilled jobs going unfilled – largely left the 
unemployed to fend for themselves.  
By the end of the 1970s, industries like automobile and steel manufacturing that 
had “once symbolized America’s economic might [were] now suffering the worst 
unemployment,” which was especially concentrated in areas dominated by a single 
industry (Byron 158). In Detroit, for example, almost 25% of the city’s automobile 
workers were unemployed in 1980 (Byron 158). The downturn in both automobile 
manufacturing and construction were connected to the oil crisis of 1973-1974 that led not 
only to a decline in the sales of large American cars, their many parts, and steel, but also 
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to the increase in the cost of manufacturing in general from which they had just started to 
recover when the second oil crisis of the decade hit in 1979. With oil expenses acting as a 
large and generally inescapable tax on doing business, in terms of transportation if not 
also in production, corporations proved unwilling to invest in construction of new 
facilities and new machinery. This would later lead to the layoffs of thousands of workers 
whose cheaper cost, compared to new machinery, could not keep declining industries 
afloat. The cheaper price of labor abroad also helped to doom labor-heavy industries like 
garment production; in 1982, for the first time in history, more workers in New York City 
were employed in nonmanufacturing jobs than manufacturing, spurred on by the growth 
of the financial industries as much as by the decline in manufacturing (Karmin and Sheler 
54).  
In her economic history of the period, Pivotal Decade: How the U.S. Traded 
Factories for Finance in the 1970s, Judith Stein notes that another contributing factor to 
the economic slowdown in the 1970s was international trade. An important tool in aiding 
countries after World War II as well as preventing many from becoming Communist, 
postwar American trade policy was based on the assumption that the American economy 
was strong enough to take the short end of the stick in negotiations. This worked well 
during the 1950s and 1960s, but by the end of the 1960s, some international economies, 
particularly West Germany and Japan, had stronger economic growth than the U.S., due 
in no small part to the favorable trade agreements they shared with the U.S. As a result, 
domestic production in the U.S. began to suffer from international competition. While 
Japan’s domestic steel companies were protected from international competitors, for 
example, American steel companies had only weak antidumping laws that the Treasury 
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Department did little to enforce (Stein 156). In addition, the rising cost of manufacturing 
in the U.S. combined with the booming economies of other countries led many producers 
to move their factories abroad, which created a serious flow of dollars to other countries, 
especially Mexico, Japan, Taiwan, and Belgium. The Trade Act of 1974 was an attempt 
to help afflicted industries in the U.S. with programs like Trade Adjustment Assistance, 
in which factory workers who were laid off because of international competition were 
given special unemployment assistance by the government (Stein 49; Businessweek 
11/14/77 144). While helpful to the unemployed workers, the feeling that “protectionism” 
was a bad word prevented the government from being more helpful by keeping the jobs 
in the country (U.S. News and World Report 5/12/80 78). 
It is also worth noting that American involvement in the world market meant that 
it was susceptible to world food shortages such as those of 1973. The resulting inflation 
in food prices was not helped by the Nixon food and wage controls. In 1973, as the price 
of food increased while wages were held down, workers struck in higher numbers than 
any year since 1959 (Stein 75). Though food prices fell and stayed fairly constant from 
1975 on, they proved again that the American economy could easily be negatively 
affected by the events of foreign countries.  
This was especially true when it came to oil. Between 1946 and 1972, 
international production in non-Communist nations grew from 8.7 million barrels a day 
to 42 million. American domestic production could not keep up with domestic 
consumption, which had tripled in volume since the 1940s for a number of reasons: 
greater car ownership, an expansion of modern heating and cooling systems, and the 
invention of new home appliances and other products. An unexpected result of the 
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environmental movement’s push against coal was an increase in demand for oil as a 
replacement. Concurrent with the increase in worldwide demand was a shift in the power 
balance, from American, British, and Dutch supremacy to a Middle Eastern advantage. 
OPEC was created in 1960 by Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran, and later 
additions included Libya, Algeria, and Qatar. By 1980, most of these countries had 
nationalized their oil production, meaning that with the boom in worldwide demand, 
these countries became very rich, and were able to use their oil advantage to become 
players in the international political sphere. This led to the “OPEC effect,” the realization 
that the third world mattered just as much as the first in world diplomacy, an unpleasant 
shock to those in the first world who would never regain their status as the world’s 
premier oil producers (Stein 75-91).  
Changes in the Work Force 
The increase in costs of food and gas contributed to an increase in the American 
cost of living. Combined with an increasing difficulty in finding or holding on to work, 
white men found that solo breadwinning became a greater challenge, leading many 
married women to go to work. As a result, over the course of the decade, the work force 
changed dramatically and permanently.  
Partly due to a series of legal measures taken to prevent discrimination in hiring 
by sex, partly a slow but long-term trend that had begun centuries earlier, and in large 
part due to economic necessity, more women than ever before joined the labor force. The 
growth was noticeable among older women and young workers, mothers of the postwar 
“baby boom” as well as the babies themselves, who had now reached working age. 
Young female workers, aged 20 to 24, also came of working age at a time of declining 
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marriage and birth rates (Waldman 10). As divorce rates and marriage age went up while 
marriage rates went down, more single and divorced women joined the workforce as 
well. 
The most remarkable increase, however, was that of mothers with small children, 
most of whom had historically remained at home, although working-class mothers had 
always worked in greater proportion than their middle- and upper-class counterparts. 
Overall, the number of working wives increased 320% from 1940 to 1970 to the point 
where two out of every five workers was female (Waldman 11). By 1980, more than half 
of all adult women, 51.4%, were working or seeking work, up from 43.4% in 1971, an 
increase that was greatest among married women (41.3% in 1971 compared to 51.4% in 
1980) (Westcott and Bednarzik 13). The participation of adult men, on the other hand, 
decreased slowly but regularly over the course of the 1970s, from 82.1% in 1971 to 
79.4% in 1980 (Westcott and Bednarzik 13).4 
The continuing addition of women as well as teenagers into the workforce led to a 
decrease in the proportion of unemployed men, but only because the proportion of 
working men in general became smaller. In 1972, there were ten million more female 
workers than there had been in 1962. Speaking in terms of the work force, the share of 
women of all ages increased from 31.6% in 1955 to 40.3% in 1976, while that of men 
decreased from 55.9% to 44.5% in the same period; “[t]he backbone of the workforce – 
men 25 to 64 – makes up a smaller and smaller share [of it]” (U.S. News and World 
Report 11/1/76 84). 
                                                          
4 By 2007, men’s participation fell to 73%, while that of women increased to almost 60%. Also that year, 
women made up 46% of the workforce (Lee and Mather 4). 
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A majority of the 18.5 million nonagricultural jobs created between 1968 and 
1978 went to women, as most were in the service sector where female workers were 
concentrated.  The increase in women workers, and the industries that grew 
correspondingly, were indicative of the country’s shift from a goods-producing economy 
pre-WWII to a predominantly service-producing economy in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Indeed, the downturn in male-dominated industries like manufacturing and construction 
led to an increase in male unemployment while female-dominated industries like retail 
sales gained jobs (Flaim, Bradshaw and Gilroy 3). 
In addition, the work status of black workers was steadily improving, although 
still a measure behind that of white workers. “For every successive peak-to-trough 
period, black workers . . . shared less of the increase of unemployment” (Gilroy 42), so 
that where the ratio of black to white unemployed workers had been about twenty to ten 
in the 1957-1958 downturn, it had improved to fourteen to ten in the 1969-1970 
recession. Black workers were also taking a greater share of the increase in jobs: in the 
1954 to 1957 recovery, thirteen black workers found jobs for every ten newly employed 
white workers; in the 1961 to 1969 prosperity, it increased to twenty-two to ten (Gilroy 
43). The quality of jobs was improving as well, especially in clerical, professional, and 
technical work, though the proportion of black workers still generally trailed behind their 
proportion of the workforce, about 10.5%, unlike in less-skilled work, where black 
workers were overrepresented (Garfinkle 25-27). As the 1970s continued, the small 
percentage of black men in upper-level professional and administrative positions 
increased from 2 to 4% (Garfinkle 29). Though black women were a much smaller 
percentage of workers in management positions (about three percent of all female 
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managers, who were themselves about 18.5%), they benefited from the increase in white-
collar clerical and sales work as much as white women and more than black men 
(Garfinkle 32). The proportion of black women in white-collar work increased from 7% 
to 10% between 1962 and 1974 (Garfinkle 33). Overall, the percentage of black workers 
in lower-paid and lower-skilled work declined, to be replaced in part by rising numbers 
of Hispanic immigrants, though their rates of unemployment were still several percentage 
points above that of white workers, and disproportional to their share of the workforce in 
general (Garfinkle 33).  
Along with the eradication of traditional areas of work, white men found that the 
newer jobs available were often not available to them. Partly from a resistance to doing 
“woman’s work,” partly from a lack of training that women were more likely to have 
received, laid-off white men, especially those in the working class, were more likely to 
keep looking for work in the field in which they were familiar than to attempt to work in 
the growing fields of office and sales that employed a growing stream of women. So as 
the workforce changed, white working-class men became a smaller share of it and were 
less able to change with it (Westcott and Bednarzik 13). 
Political and Social Developments 
 One of the bigger changes of the 1970s that was to greatly affect the next decade 
was the emergence of the New Right, made up of libertarians and religious conservatives 
who were much more politically conservative than what became known as the Old Right. 
Though the two subgroups eventually acted together in the body of the Republican Party, 
they did not agree on every particular and were not always united in their objective. But 
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their common enemies and goals were enough to help them defeat the more moderate 
Republicans within the party and eventually help elect Reagan in 1980.  
 Though the campaign to elect Barry Goldwater to the presidency in 1964 was 
unsuccessful, it revealed the efficacy of grassroots activism, as Goldwater’s nomination 
to the Republican ticket would not have occurred without the efforts of the middle-class 
men and women in places like Southern California, to whom Goldwater’s exhortations 
against the ongoing threat of Communism rang true. The specter of Communism also 
helped to inspire the Christian fundamentalist movement. Fundamentalist churches, 
unlike those of the older Christian denominations, were “newer, theologically simpler, 
and more emotionally and relationally intense churches” (Rodgers 168). They fit well in 
the individualist Sunbelt environment in which beneficiaries of the booming economy 
wanted to enjoy their hard-earned rewards without being told to contribute to a New 
Deal-like welfare system that helped those not strong or smart enough to achieve as much 
as they had themselves. Fundamentalist churches also portrayed Communism as a Satanic 
threat to the Christian nation of America, and claimed liberals were only aiding Satan in 
his dark quest through welfare, the United Nations, and the teaching of sex education in 
public schools (McGirr 71). To those in areas dominated by the federally-funded defense 
industry, anti-Communist fervor also helped to fuel the feeling that they were working on 
God’s behalf.   
 The John Birch Society, another organization devoted to spreading the word of 
the oncoming Communist/Satanic revolution, also found a receptive audience in Southern 
California and other booming Sunbelt areas. The Birchers, as they were known, were 
generally seen as part of the reason Goldwater failed to win in 1964, as they were among 
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the more extremist of the conservative groups and scared off many moderate 
Republicans, who at that point still made up the majority of the national party. Ronald 
Reagan, running for governor of California in 1966, was able to utilize Bircher sentiment 
without incorporating the more radical aspects of the group, a skill that would come in 
handy in his later presidential runs.  
 The attempt in the late 1960s and early 1970s to expand the reach of the 
Democratic Party into demographics like the young, women, minorities, and the middle-
class left out traditional blocs like labor. Eugene McGovern’s lack of interest in appealing 
to the established Democratic ally in his presidential campaign in 1972 while 
encouraging the countercultural youth who alienated labor leaders and workers left the 
“Silent Majority,” as Nixon came to call them, free to be scooped up by Nixon’s 
moderate conservatism (Stein 70). Nixon was also aided by social divisions emerging 
between the elite and younger members of the Democrats and the middle- and lower-
class white voters who opposed busing as a means of school integration they labeled as 
racists, despite evidence that busing was broadly unpopular (Kuhn 67). 
Nixon’s reelection was less a sign of a growing shift to the right – indeed, it was 
the opposite, according to a poll that observed a noticeable shift to the left on the issues 
among most Americans between 1968 and 1972 (Stein 72) – than it was a sign that 
McGovern had estranged many voters. White male working-class voters in particular lost 
no love for Nixon but could not tolerate McGovern’s radicalism and apparent disregard 
for labor, no mean feat for Nixon given that McGovern had had a remarkably pro-labor 
record in the Senate (Kuhn 63; Cowie 87). As Nixon pointed out at the time, “[t]he real 
issues of the election are the ones like patriotism, morality, religion – not the material 
47 
 
issues. … If the issues were prices and taxes, they’d vote for McGovern. We’ve done 
things labor doesn’t like. … But they’ll support us for these other reasons” (quoted in 
Cowie 124). Nixon’s valuable insight, which McGovern failed to utilize, was “making 
workers’ economic interests secondary to an appeal to their moral backbone, patriotic 
rectitude, whiteness, and machismo in the face of the inter-related threats of social decay, 
racial unrest, and faltering national purpose” (Cowie 127). Though the Republicans 
profited from that Democratic misstep and Nixon’s clever use of rhetoric, the white male 
shift to the Republican Party was not yet guaranteed, nor was the Republican Party of 
Nixon’s liberally moderate conservatism in 1972 similar to the more hard-line 
conservative party of Reagan in 1980. However, as Cowie pointed out, it is here that we 
can begin to see the reaction of some working-class men to the perceived threats to 
manhood posed by McGovern and the new model of the Democratic Party, an uneasiness 
Reagan would later utilize. 
 The Watergate scandal and Ford’s pardon of Nixon gave the Democrats an easy 
win in the midterm elections of 1974, and they gained the majority in both houses. 
Followed by Ford’s less than impressive term in office and loss to Carter in 1976 – who 
won even more of the white male vote than the white female, 47% to 46% (Kuhn 68) – it 
seemed like traditional conservatives were on the brink of dying out altogether. But 
Carter’s failure to combat many of the problems Americans wanted him to – the energy 
crisis (even before the 1979-80 oil shortage), unemployment, presenting a tough face to 
the U.S.S.R. in treaty talks and the world in general – left a political vacuum that the 
Republicans rushed to fill in the midterm elections in 1978. They proved successful at 
recasting the political narrative:  
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[Republicans were not] a party of big business and the wealthy, but . . . a party of 
the little guy, the regular American Joe and his wife, while the Democratic party 
belonged to elitists who imposed schemes of social engineering, social privilege, 
and special interests on the little guy. (Marjorie Spruill, quoted in Kalman 263) 
The narrative was also amended to show that Carter’s election had been an aberration in 
an otherwise obvious Republican revolution that began with Goldwater in 1964, though 
Reagan was aided in his win by Carter’s many problems.  
Carter’s inability to effectively lead the country through difficult social and 
economic situations meant that the “national experiment with quiet, secure, non-macho 
leadership” would prove unsuccessful:  
“As it was, when someone ‘stands up and raises his voice and says, goddamit 
(sic), we’re going to do something about this problem,’ Americans cheered. 
‘They don’t even listen to what he’s saying. Nor do they listen to what you say; 
they only know you say it slower and softer.’” (Carter advisor Gerald Rafshoon, 
quoted in Kalman 317) 
Had Carter made different decisions, or acted differently, or been an entirely different 
person, there is no guarantee that Reagan would have actually won in 1980. The 
rightward shift of the late 1970s was to a great degree in reaction to Carter’s failures, not 
an inevitable conclusion, but some of those failures included actions that added to a 
feeling among white men of losing overall authority, personally, nationally, and in terms 
of world standing. Reagan was able to capitalize on Carter’s apparent lack of masculinity 
in his less forceful, more fallible mode of leading. Carter’s “crisis of confidence” speech 
in June 1979 included his observation that the country had become consumption-
obsessed and self-absorbed, but such reprimands did not find hospitable ground among 
all of his listeners, and instead provided Reagan with a more positive, self-congratulatory 
response: “How can we not believe in the greatness of America? . . . We’re Americans,” 
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and “I find no national malaise. I find nothing wrong with the American people” (quoted 
in Rodgers 25 and Mattson 185). Empty claims of confidence seemed manlier and were 
easier to support than thoughtful discussions of shortcomings. Carter lost the Democrats 
the white-male vote for the rest of the twentieth century (Kalman 265).5 
Similarly, the rise in religious conservatism was largely due to the perceived 
threats to masculinity and traditional sex roles instigated by the many social movements 
of the era: 
A sense of faltering manhood helped to fuel concern that Americans had grown 
disastrously weak; that homosexuality would run rampant among men if tolerated 
and made public; that men were ceding their responsibilities to discipline 
children to others; that feminist ideas, insinuating their way into the culture of 
ordinary housewives, blurring gender lines and reversing gender roles, were 
already sapping the power of husbands. (Rodgers 170) 
For many, fighting what they felt was untoward liberal influence in public education was 
their first experience with political action, and would often lead to later involvement in 
grassroots political activism. Despite his own strong association with Christianity, Carter 
became a hated target of the fundamentalists for, among other things, establishing the 
Department of Education, which was viewed as another advance in the secularization of 
education (Kuhn 82).  
Fundamentalist spokespeople like Phyllis Schlafly and Anita Bryant labeled 
feminists enemies of “the family,” trying to “replace the image of woman as virtue and 
mother with the image of prostitute, swinger, and lesbian” (Schlafly, quoted in Kalman 
72). The defense of “traditional” values appealed to many who felt confused by the shifts 
in ideals about how men and women were supposed to act. But even fundamentalist 
                                                          
5 Carter’s weak majority was 47%, which fell to 32% in 1980 (Kuhn 5); the next Democratic presidential 
candidate to get over 40% of the white-male vote would be Barack Obama in 2008 (Noah). 
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homes often had dual earners as time went on, and the justifications for letting women 
work were incorporated into otherwise “traditional” ideology: men were to be “loving” 
and “humble” but not dominating, while women were to give “intelligent willing and 
joyful submission” without being servile (the Danvers Statement, quoted in Rodgers 
173). Women could work, but not in jobs that might undermine male coworkers’ 
manhood. 
  
As seen through employment, the economy, and politics, the events of the 1970s 
created an environment in which white male authority was thrown into question. Though 
they were and remained the greatest share of the workforce, their share was reduced, and 
their ability to find work made less certain. Industries that had employed fathers and sons 
for decades were shutting down factories and leaving nothing behind. The government 
seemed not to care or even notice. These vicissitudes were discussed in the media, the 
growing instability both in employment and ideas of what it meant to be a man. What 
emerges from that discussion is a sense that when the ability to work was at risk, men 
feared seeming less masculine, even if the reasons they were unemployed were out of 
their control, such as the shutdown of a factory. This fear was sometimes encouraged by 
the media itself, whose subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) biases contributed to the 




Chapter 2: Popular Discourses of Employment and Masculinity 
 
This chapter shows the national discourse on the topics of work and masculinity: 
how the unemployed saw themselves, and how society viewed the unemployed, as well 
as how the discussion of men themselves was changing. The link between men and work 
was taken for granted, an assumption that provides a glimpse into why men put such 
pressure on themselves to work, and took it so personally when work failed them. 
Through this discussion, we can better understand how the worries about threatened 
manhood at a time of economic instability were diffused through the media and the 
public, contributing to the sense that the country’s power, and white men’s share of it, 
were on the decline. 
Men and Employment 
To express the toll it took on the American working man, media discussion of 
unemployment often took place in the language of masculinity, though certainly 
unconsciously. This was particularly evident in interviews with unemployed men, but 
journalists could also be perceived to editorialize in their choice of words, describing the 
effects of unemployment on “him” rather than “her” or “them” when discussing 
unemployment in general, even though there were always, throughout the 1970s, more 
unemployed women than men. Unless expressly described otherwise, the men of these 
pieces were also white, thus locating the discourse even more firmly in the language of 
white masculinity. 
 In a society where “most men [were] brought up to think their jobs [were] so 
important that it became part of their internal identity,” where the type of work one 
performed was “a key element in defining one’s social role, status, and personal identity” 
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and something that could “give meaning to life,” unemployment meant the loss of more 
than “just a job” (psychologist Basil Najjar, quoted in U.S. News and World Report 
1/27/75 54; Hesson 390; Byron 45). Work provided a sense of purpose as well as a 
community of like-minded men. “Whenever a man is without work, he is without much 
more than buying power. His whole life is changed” (U.S. News and World Report 
5/21/79 95). Unemployment meant “the disintegration of your confidence as a man and 
your ability to protect your family from economic disaster,” which was manifested in 
stress, anxiety, ulcers (Hesson 390).  
Who was to blame for being unemployed? In some cases, it was externalized, 
aimed at the companies for shutting down or the government for not addressing the issue. 
One unemployed auto worker used his time to keep his skills sharp: “A man’s got to keep 
his hands in tune, his mind alert. You can’t let them slowly kill you and let your family 
go naked. Not this man” (quoted in Byron 46). The “them” in this instance could refer to 
the company that laid him off, the government that refused to help, or simply the 
amorphous worry that threatened a working-class father who could not support his 
family. And even knowing the external factors, being unemployed could also feel like a 
personal failing. As psychiatrist Dr. Alvin Poussaint noted, “[u]nemployment and low 
wages affect [men’s] lives with their loved ones and family and even though 
unemployment is society’s fault, these men often blame themselves. This is of particular 
significance in the lives of black men who have suffered so much unemployment and 
have so much concern for their manhood” (quoted in Ebony 8/72 100). 
The pain of losing one’s job affected all classes, though the language differed 
somewhat; the “plight” and “agony” of white-collar workers – the “psychological strain,” 
53 
 
claimed Time, “is hardest on middle-aged, upper-middle-income executives, who felt 
wedded to their companies and drew strong creative satisfactions from their jobs” (Time 
3/17/75 22)6 – was contrasted with the “lowdown blues” of blue-collar workers in the 
automobile and steel industries (U.S. News and World Report 1/27/75; Time 10/5/70; 
Time 11/9/70), whose identity was no less tied to their place of employment, which often 
included a family history of association with a particular company. While blue-collar 
work was in general much more volatile than white-collar, going through cyclical ups and 
downs throughout the year, white-collar work was experiencing its first great increase in 
instability since the postwar boom took off, and many workers were laid off for the first 
time: 
[T]he disappearance of engineering jobs in 1969-70 caused such severe 
emotional disorganization among the engineers laid off [because] they had never 
expected that professionals like themselves could ever be thrown into the 
industrial job market in that way – i.e., that their skills might ever be unneeded. 
(Sennett and Cobb 227n) 
But white-collar workers had assets many blue-collar workers did not. In a 1972 piece in 
Esquire, Peter Swerdloff, who had recently been laid off from Time magazine, wrote that 
though many of his well-educated friends had been unexpectedly let go, “a certain gaiety 
prevail[ed] among the victims. Young people with a lifetime of busy success behind them 
have discovered that slothfulness can be fun” (Swerdloff 66), which, while nice for them, 
could not be said of all those unemployed. 
                                                          
6 Though race and gender are unspecified, I assume the author of the piece was referring to white men, as 
the percentage of “middle-aged, upper-middle-income executives” in 1975 who were not white men was 
extremely small. Indeed, that this was unmentioned helps to illuminate the unspoken assumptions present 




Beyond the economy, another large force worked to change the status quo. By the 
1970s, the women’s liberation movement, or “women’s lib,” had helped to push through 
several legal measures that worked to combat sex discrimination.7 The entry of working 
wives into the work force led to a rethinking of established norms, especially among 
working-class and middle-class men and women, though the working class proved more 
fruitful as a subject of sociological study during the decade, as in The Hidden Injuries of 
Class (1972) by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, and Worlds of Pain (1976) by 
Lillian Rubin, both of which were preceded in their study of the working class at home 
by Mirra Komarovsky’s Blue-Collar Marriage (1962). The 1970s studies each observed 
a strain in working-class families between husbands who had never wanted their wives to 
work and the wives who often tended to enjoy working outside of the home, but there 
also remained a strong sense for both men and women that men were supposed to work, 
and those who failed were failures as men, not living up to their part of the bargain. 
 In some cases, wives were able to make as much or more as their husbands, and 
the phenomenon of the “househusband” appeared in the mainstream. Though households 
that were principally or solely supported by a working woman were always a small 
minority of working couples – in 1968, only 2% of wives supplied 75% or more of their 
family’s income, and that number never exceeded 5% in the 1970s (Waldman 16; Rones 
and Leon 11) – the idea of men staying home while their wives worked gained some 
traction. Articles discussing the matter appeared in Time, Ladies’ Home Journal, and 
Businessweek, among others, in different tones but all sharing a certain puzzled 
                                                          
7 Specifically, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the 1972 
Education Act, and Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, which established a policy of “affirmative action” 
in hiring for federally-funded contracts. 
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fascination by the idea. “The husband willing not to just help at home but instead to 
liberate his wife totally from the kitchen remains a rare species,” noted Time (Time 
2/18/74 76), while Ladies’ Home Journal, not pulling its punches, commented that “[i]n 
our present society, such an arrangement is called ‘role reversal’ – except when it’s called 
‘weird’ or ‘abnormal’” (Pogrebin 30). The authors of a piece in Intellect wondered 
whether the “liberated husband” was “father – or babysitter?” and the fathers interviewed 
did not seem sure, either (Hillman, Raskin and Orloff-Kaplan 462-465).  
Men stayed home – or “copped out,” as Businessweek put it (Businessweek 
11/14/77) – for a number of reasons, though about half were receiving disability benefits 
and undoubtedly included a large percentage of Vietnam veterans who had been 
wounded, making Businessweek’s use of the term “cop out,” as in to “shirk” or “evade,” 
unnecessarily harsh. The sense that to not work was unmanly could be particularly unfair 
to those injured in Vietnam, who appeared to receive little respect for their sacrifice. 
Almost two-thirds of men aged 25 to 34 who stayed home had working wives, and some 
did so to take care of their children, but never very many. In 1979, in a survey of the 
unemployed, of those who “did not want a job now,” less than 2% of men listed “keeping 
house” as their reason for not wanting to work, while 49% listed retirement, the largest 
proportion of men in this group. Of those who wanted a job but were not looking, 2.6% 
listed “home responsibilities” as their reason for not looking for work, while about 65% 
listed either “school attendance” or “illness/disability” (Leon and Rones 9), which again 
likely included veterans.  
Younger men were more able to adapt to the shift in norms that would let men 
give up their provider role in order to take on the more “feminine” role of child-raising, 
56 
 
but they were still fairly anomalous. Articles that discussed this rare breed usually did so 
in terms of a group interview, one featuring newsman Ted Koppel, who stayed home with 
his children while his wife went to law school. The tone of these men was proud but 
somewhat defensive: “The fact is,” one said, “[my wife] makes more than I ever did 
when I worked full time – and I have a loving family. I don’t need to make money to feel 
like a man.” Another, a father of eleven whose wife was a highly ranked state 
government official, declared, “I keep this house together. If eleven children isn’t a 
career, what is?” (quoted in Pogrebin 34) These men were in the unfamiliar position of 
having to defend staying at home. One hoped this would prevent his young son from 
developing the “machismo hang-ups that afflict many men” (Time 2/18/74 76).  
Though women generally moved into work in a few specific industries – domestic 
service, teaching, clerical work, nursing, and retail sales (Waldman 12) – they also spread 
into almost every other job listed in the Census. This was especially true over the course 
of the 1970s as the field of teaching became saturated. Teachers had been in high demand 
in the postwar baby boom, but as the birth rate declined, so did demand for people to 
teach them. This, along with increased demand for female workers in fields where 
women were poorly represented as a result of the presidential Executive Orders requiring 
that “affirmative action” be taken to hire more women and minorities, contributed to a 
diffusion of women into a broader variety of jobs, though while their proportional 
representation increased, the numbers of actual female employees in many non-
traditional fields remained low.  
In some cases, men moved into “women’s” work as women moved into “men’s,” 
as seen in a study discussed in “Pink-Collar Men and Blue-Collar Women” (Psychology 
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Today, 1979). The sample of fifty workers who worked at a company that “actively 
promote[d] ‘sex atypical’ job assignments for people who want[ed] them” (Asher 31) was 
happier in their current work – men doing clerical jobs, women in manual jobs – than in 
otherwise “traditional” fields, as their jobs better fit their interests and skills than sex-
stereotyped work would have, and the decision to work in an atypical job added an extra 
pressure to perform well. The interesting difference came in how these workers wanted to 
be viewed by their coworkers; the blue-collar women wanted to be thought of “as good 
as” the men, while the “pink-collar” men wanted to be seen as “better than” the women 
with whom they worked. “Several [men] found it unthinkable that they might fail at a job 
that women could do” (Asher 32), while their female officemates “wondered why any 
man would choose such work,” a sign of how poorly esteemed such “women’s work” 
was judged by men as well as by the women who did it themselves. The more typically 
employed pink- or blue-collar workers were initially mistrustful of the new additions but 
came to find that having them around made for a more interesting work environment. 
Some women moved up the job ladder into management, which created a new set 
of issues. In the October 1974 issue of the Saturday Evening Post, one female executive, 
a company president, made a series of observations in the provocatively titled article, 
“Why Men Fear Women in Business.” Where the world of work had been a men-only 
dominion, “Uncle Sam[,] traitor to his sex, has ordered that the hunt be opened to 
women, that there be equal opportunity, that the Man’s World hang out both ‘his’ and 
‘her’ signs” (Schoonover 48). Women executives, she explained, somewhat tongue-in-
cheek, were seen as too emotional, too susceptible to sexual tension, wanting to be men. 
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Men, for their part, were unused to seeing women in positions of power other than their 
mothers, and they feared what changes could mean to their position in society.  
However, though female executives were still rare and had to continually reassert 
their roles to outsiders, the men who worked under them seemed to adjust fairly well. 
“Becoming noticeable in many firms is a reduction of the bitterness displayed by some 
male executives who had perceived women as ‘outsiders’ usurping their role in 
management” (U.S. News and World Report 12/8/75 55; also, Kirkendall 158). One 
career consultant even thought women had a better shot at getting ahead in business than 
men, especially as affirmative action laws took hold (U.S. News and World Report 
12/8/75 59). But in general, women were advised that in order to move ahead in business, 
without the male “old-boy” networks of which to take advantage, they had to work harder 
than their male counterparts. Those that got to a position of power were few, but could 
prove to their subordinates that they had earned it.  
A 1977 Ladies’ Home Journal article asked, “What happens when the ‘man at the 
top’ is a woman?” Interviews with several women executives, including the highest 
ranked woman at the New York Times, a vice president for a department store chain, and 
a president of an electrical contracting firm, concluded that if a woman “carried real 
power, then both male and female subordinates respond[ed] with respect and 
productivity,” in the words of sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kanter (quoted in Pogrebin 24). 
But women were still not always able to move up past the level they had worked to reach, 
and had to work around assumptions to appear independent, such as never asking an 
assistant to bring them coffee. Interestingly, the only woman interviewed who worked in 
a blue-collar industry, the electrical contracting firm, was also the only one to say she 
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sometimes had to “play to the male ego” to achieve results. “If I have a job to get done, I 
might have to turn on the charm and tell the guys how much I need them. When they feel 
like my protectors, they feel better about putting out” (Pogrebin 38). Work could go 
smoother if the president of the company pretended she was not in charge and appealed 
to her more traditionally-minded employees in a manner with which they were more 
comfortable.  
 
These articles show that in the media, the subject of work was discussed from a 
variety of perspectives. Work was defined in terms of men, in many ways; men were 
expected to work, and thus any aberration was noteworthy and due for some judgment, 
even if the cause of not working was a war injury. Women at work, on the other hand, 
were still in many ways a new phenomenon, so they were discussed in more exploratory, 
if occasionally patronizing, tones.  
Attitudes about class emerged as well through difference in tone, and there 
sometimes appeared a subtle suggestion that white-collar employment, as it was labeled 
more mentally strenuous than blue-collar, engendered a stronger personal connection to 
the work. However, Swerdloff’s essay about the young, well-educated unemployed 
seemed almost facile about the topic, while the words of blue-collar men without work 
showed a greater respect for the action of work and the need to do it. This distinction 
supports the separation that emerged between upper-middle-class and working-class 
white voters as seen in the last chapter. Unemployment, or “dropping out” while the wife 
worked, was for those who could afford it an opportunity to explore different jobs, or 
60 
 
take care of the children, or, in the case of men’s liberation in the next chapter, discuss 
one’s problems with being a man. But there were many who could not afford to support a 
family on unemployment benefits or one salary, and if they were ever home while their 
wives worked, it was because they had been laid off.  
However, what both groups of men had in common, as the decade continued and 
as the next part will show, was a growing feeling of having to fend off some perceived 
threat to masculinity. The following section examines how the masculinity of these 
employed or unemployed men was disseminated in the media, a much more diffuse and 
complicated subject than the statistics of employment, but tracing a similar sense of 
unease. 
A ‘New’ Masculinity? 
The changes in established norms suggested by the women’s movement and its 
men’s liberation offshoot, discussed in the next chapter, proved unsettling and strange for 
most journalists. In a 1972 Reader’s Digest interview with sociologist and early 
proponent of sex education Lester Kirkendall, James Lincoln Collier asked, “Are men 
really men anymore? … Is there a ‘new masculinity,’ a new way for men to act, feel and 
think about themselves?” (Kirkendall 158) Kirkendall thought yes, that new ideals would 
allow men to do all the things they felt would make them appear unmanly, such as 
expressing tenderness and affection, letting their wives make decisions without appearing 
hen-pecked, and allowing women more of the lead in bed. Though this article came out in 
favor, overall, of the new developments, the initial question is jarring – if men act 
differently than they are expected to, are they still men?  
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Collier also investigated the origin of the American masculine ideal. Kirkendall 
connected it to “a man’s idea of his authority” (Kirkendall 155), originally located among 
the early pioneers of the West, who were in an environment where men had to be hard 
and stoic to survive and protect their family. This interpretation overlooks the fact that, 
just as often, women had to survive and protect their family as well, and that it was only 
in popular representation – such as dime novels or, later, movies – that men were shown 
as the sole actors in the pioneer family, while the wives and children appeared more as 
reactors. The fictionalized frontier “seemed to write large the differences that seemed 
apparent even in more normal life between men and women” (Stearns 52), regardless of 
whether those differences were as actual as they were apparent.   
A more common view, however, as mentioned earlier, placed modern masculinity 
as originating in the period of industrialization and separation between work and home. A 
1978 article in Newsweek, “How Men Are Changing,” asserted that industrialization gave 
men a “lonely new authority as breadwinners in the harsh world of factories and 
foundries” (Gelman, Huck and Camp 53), in that the loss of authority at work was made 
up for with an increase in authority at home, guaranteed by the financial transaction of 
family support. Similarly, in “Women’s Fib,” Marvin Harris of Natural History 
suggested that in industrial societies, subordination of women was the benefit to men who 
were subordinate to other men in war and work (Harris 22). The authors of the Newsweek 
piece claimed that the 1960s marked the first occasion of challenge to male sovereignty, 
though men of previous generations who witnessed the suffrage movement might have 
disagreed with that statement.  
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One common theme was the possibility of androgyny as a solution to the sex roles 
problem, the popularity of which indicated that it apparently “met a widely-felt need for 
an image of change in sexual character” (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 567). Confusion over 
what was now right or wrong to do in relating to the opposite sex led to a welcoming of 
any alternative that seemed to offer a clear set of rules. Though proponents of the idea 
seemed mostly to suggest it as an unlikely but possibly effective solution, encouraged by 
the popularity of epicene glam rocker David Bowie, those opposed took it very seriously, 
as another sign that the liberation movement was proposing nothing less than the end of 
western civilization. Androgyny, in this case, did not mean indeterminate or mixed 
gender so much as “unisexualism,” as John Nichols put it, such as giving little boys dolls 
as well as trucks, or establishing public bathrooms that either gender could use. The 
thought behind it was that if roles are not innate but were in fact outwardly imposed, then 
changing the environment would change the way the role was learned (Nichols 58-59). 
Marc Feigen Fasteau in Psychology Today suggested that men and women were not as 
different as people seemed to think, and that perhaps androgyny would be an 
improvement, a thought similar to that expressed by Robert A. Fein in “Men and Young 
Children” (Men and Masculinity, 1974).  
I have seen no evidence that the discussion of androgyny or unisexualism was 
ever seriously intended to accomplish more than, for instance, encourage boys to learn 
how to cook. But in opposing it, those who did so brought a measure of legitimacy to the 
issue, perhaps more than it might have had otherwise. In 1974, a fundamentalist Baptist 
minister in Connecticut vigorously opposed having boys in seventh grade take classes in 
home economics because he feared it would make them gay, or at the very least disrupt 
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the purity of traditional gender roles. Said the minister, “Our society has been built upon 
the sanctity of the home. If they destroy that they’ll destroy America” (Rice 65). George 
Gilder, another big adversary of the incipient androgyny revolution, also opposed it on 
the basis of tradition, fearing that the natural sex roles humans had lived with for so long 
would be utterly destroyed by coeducation or women and men earning the same amount 
for doing the same work, much less androgyny. Though some welcomed Gilder’s ideas, 
to some degree, as a counter to the “bombardment” of women’s lib and “the whole 
current Playboy-gay activist-Joy of Sex copulatory manual ethic of sexual hedonism,” his 
worries about androgyny did not seem warranted, and indeed, seemed to be contradicted 
by his own thesis: “If our lives are so completely biologically determined by sex 
differentiation, as Gilder makes out, then worries about a coming androgynous society 
are groundless; it simply won’t happen” (Fremont-Smith 79). 
Not everyone took the issue of unsteady masculinity so seriously. John Mariani of 
New York, writing in the magazine’s tongue-in-cheek tone, suggested that the “new 
macho” should be called “Neo-macho, because such a term sounds slightly more effete” 
(Mariani 41). The article goes on to describe how a man in a bar who declaimed the “old 
macho” ways of just trying to get women to sleep with him was, by doing so, successful 
in getting his female listeners to want to sleep with him. “By repudiating the old macho, 
the first man had made himself the hero of all the women present. What could be more 
macho? . . . [M]acho has changed since the good old days, when it meant something like 
putting out a cigarette in your hand, to the new days, when it is more likely to mean 
emptying an ashtray;” that is, from uncomplaining toughness to unimposing politeness. 
The author compares the old macho to the new, with contrasts like Humphrey Bogart 
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(old) and Woody Allen (new); Bela Lugosi’s Frankenstein’s monster (old) and Peter 
Boyle’s monster in the comedy “Young Frankenstein” (1974) (new). The article’s 
humorous tone allowed the author to poke fun at the “new macho” while also subtly 
congratulating these “new men” on knowing how to play the situation to their advantage.  
Some male journalists made their opinion clear, with titles such as “The Guilty 
Sex: How American Men Became Irrelevant,” or “Women’s Fib.” “The Guilty Sex,” a 
1975 essay by Stephen Koch in Esquire, displays a sort of irritated resignation about 
women’s lib. He asserts that men were beginning to change before women began 
accusing them of villainy, that they had already rejected the “jock” norms with which 
they were raised, the idea that being a father meant ignoring your children unless they 
needed disciplining. The attractive formula of “us versus them” had originally meant the 
“sons of the counterculture” versus “those jocks and sons of jocks whom every campus 
protest instinctively understood to be the Enemy” (Koch 53). The women’s movement 
adopted and adapted that language, and made men into “Them,” guilty just by being men; 
but what of the men who also felt “mutilated, baffled and enraged by plenty of the 
prevalent middle-class notions of manhood[?] It is indeed difficult to either surrender or 
fulfill the desire to be recognized, loved and admired as a man; difficult to surrender or 
fulfill the absurd sexualized fantasy of wisdom, self-confidence, attractiveness, focus of 
identity, fulsomeness of love, totality of competence, personal power and success one is 
supposed to want. … I have sometimes confused and betrayed myself trying to ‘be a 
man,’ and likewise trying not to be” (Koch 56).  
The privileges of white maleness were seductive, yet confining, the demands 
sometimes impossible to achieve. Koch was writing during the spread of men’s 
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liberation, and the questions he raised were similar to many of those discussed in 
consciousness-raising groups in some parts of the U.S., generally by well-educated, well-
off white men. Being a man, was supposed to be the end result of embodying a set of 
requirements, and in exchange for doing so, one would be “recognized, loved, and 
admired as a man,” as Koch put it. But what if one did not want to perform part or all of 
those requirements? What if one lost a job or was in a job that would not lead to 
“success”? Though the writings of men’s liberation, examined in the next chapter, were 
limited in scope and intended audience, they did bring these questions into the 
mainstream discussion, as seen above. As an attempt to work on the problems of the 
patriarchy and become more comfortable with working women and their own emotions, 
men’s liberation was in some ways laudable. But over time, Chapter Three will show that 
the movement began to evolve away from a more pro-feminist stance into one that had to 
fend off perceived threats to the masculinity men’s libbers were supposedly trying to 
moderate themselves. As Koch asks, what of the men who also felt “mutilated, baffled 
and enraged by plenty of the prevalent middle-class notions of manhood”?  Men’s lib 
became not a movement to help men grow, but instead an advocate for men’s rights, 
specifically white men. This paralleled the way working-class men were moving away 
from liberal politics, in an overarching trend of defending traditional white masculinity 




Chapter 3: Men’s Liberation 
 
Men’s liberation was one attempt by white men to counter the questions to 
masculinity inherent in the social and economic changes of the decade. Though it was not 
particularly successful, its evolution from a liberal to more conservative and more diverse 
movement offers an interesting example of the shift in men’s thinking over the 1970s. 
The benefits of the patriarchal system especially benefited these upper-middle and 
middle-class men, so there was little to gain from actively trying to change it, which the 
working-class men who became more politically conservative could not say. But both 
groups’ shift to conservative thinking was to indicate that they were not responsible for 
every other social group’s problems while overlooking their many real advantages, a neat 
trick of misdirection men’s lib figured out early. In addition, the works of men’s 
liberation also offer an interesting look at the beginnings of men’s studies, the field that 
inspired this paper. 
As one of the issues that affected most men was the need to support their family, a 
common theme among men’s lib writers was work, both the compulsion to do so and the 
demands of the job itself. The discussion of work, at least among these usually upper-
middle-class men, sheds a useful light on how these writers conceptualized the historical 
and current pressure on men to be breadwinners. However, one reason men’s lib was not 
able to instigate national change the way the feminist movement did is that the writers 
were, without wanting to admit to it, or perhaps even able to realize it, well served by the 
system they were criticizing. Their ability to collect graduate degrees and spend time 
thinking and writing about the state of “men” kept them largely unconnected from the 
rest of the country, including white men in the working class. Unlike the larger and more 
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politically effective feminist and gay rights movements, men’s lib and its works were 
never in a position to sincerely affect the mainstream state of affairs.8 The failure of 
men’s lib to understand or even consider the positions or needs of men out of its 
restricted purview – including lower-class white men, as well as gay men, minorities, or 
men of non-Western cultures – corresponds to some extent with the failure of the more 
sensitive masculine model, socially and politically.  
However, as the predecessor of today’s men’s studies scholarship, the genre of 
men’s lib is still critically important. Though their writing style could be overblown, the 
discussion of which they were a part were an influential aspect of 1970s culture, for those 
who found legitimation of their own issues as well as those who found the whole debate 
silly. This chapter will explore the history of the movement and the discussion within the 
genre on the subject of work. 
 
The Movement 
In reaction to the women’s, gay rights, and civil rights social movements that 
criticized the white, heterosexual patriarchy, some, though by no means all or even most, 
straight white men realized that even though they were ostensibly benefited by the 
patriarchy, they were also susceptible to that social pressure, and established the men’s 
liberation movement to work on that problem. So already the criticism by women and 
gay men about the domination and subordination inherent in male-female relationships 
could be subsumed into one where men were conflicted within themselves, a subtle 
distraction from the real problems of patriarchy. This could be cured by a change in 
                                                          
8 Note Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, what men’s lib did do, “very successfully, [was] produce publicists.” 
(Carrigan, Connell and Lee 575). 
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thinking as opposed to changes in the power dynamic, noted Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 
thus eliminating the need to give up any male authority to women.  
In the 1960s, the initial shots across the bow of sex role theory – the idea that men 
and women were biologically predisposed to fit within the family relationship in socially 
acceptable patterns, first discussed in the 1940s by social scientists (Carrigan, Connell 
and Lee 554-556)  – were by the sons of middle-class businessmen who rejected the 
masculine values with which they had been raised: “either shouting, or that soul-crushing 
silence most deeply installed in the soul of any red-blooded American boy: Dad mute 
behind his newspaper” (Koch 54). The “weakly fathered and fatherless sons of the 
counterculture” (Koch 53) came out against the consumerist society in which they grew 
up, and to which they were expected to contribute, by abandoning their grey flannel suits 
in favor of jeans and crochet.  
But over the course of the decade, these activists found themselves on the 
receiving end of the protest. In the late 1960s, the civil rights movement moved into a 
more nationalist, exclusionary phase; later, the feminist and gay rights movements 
appropriated the language and means of protest these white, middle-class men had been 
using. Their momentum was also halted by the winding down of the draft and the war in 
general in 1972 and 1973, removing one of the bigger targets of the countercultural 
dissent. “Having spent most, if not all, of their adult lives in social criticism and 
confrontation, young, white-male activists had believed they were the vanguard of a 
social justice movement that would transform society. Now suddenly they found 
themselves forced to the sidelines, with social ferment spinning off in new directions” 
(Gambill 1).  
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As white, middle-class young men had questioned the social norm that expected 
them to work the same impersonal, unsatisfying job their often-absent father had worked, 
so now did white, middle-class young women question their mandatory role in the home. 
Women’s liberation condemned the social, family, and governmental patriarchy, a system 
in which men dominate and women are largely excluded or subordinate. The sexual 
revolution, aided by the spread of abortion and the creation of the birth control pill, made 
women as free to initiate sexual relationships as men and to demand they be brought to 
orgasm, creating anxiety for those men who had never had to worry about such a thing 
before. Another attack on established ideas of manhood came from gay rights activists, 
whose movement gained direction and momentum following the Stonewall Inn riots in 
1969.  
These critiques, especially from the feminists, sparked further discussion among 
some white men, partly as a way to deflect the barrage of criticism. Though the gay rights 
movement offered probably the most directed and immediate criticism of straight 
masculinity, most of the writing on straight men’s issues ranged “between generally 
ignoring homosexuals and homosexuality, and totally ignoring them” (Carrigan, Connell 
and Lee 577). Men who were most open to exploring their own sex role preconceptions 
were initially only to be found in liberal, well-educated, economically comfortable 
enclaves like Berkeley and San Francisco, CA, and New York City, but as coverage of 
the issue spread, through mainstream news outlets and new publications devoted to the 
cause, “men’s liberation,” or men’s lib, became labeled a movement of its own. Between 
1971 and 1980, thirty-eight English-language non-fiction books about men, the male role, 
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and masculinity were published, and a genre was established (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 
567). 
Men’s lib meant “freedom from destructive competition, from the fear of being 
called effeminate, from the terror of sexual failure, from the nervousness that inhibits 
male friendship – from all the cultural straitjackets and mental stereotypes that warp 
men’s attitudes and behavior” (Nichols, back cover). Proponents also recommended a 
more active role in fatherhood. Men’s lib was spread through consciousness-raising (CR) 
groups in which men got together in small groups to discuss the pressures they felt as 
men, with the hopes of encouraging them all to try to change the behaviors that made 
them unhappy. The CR groups became networked across the country, and more than two 
dozen “men’s centers” were established, mostly in the Northeast, upper Midwest, and 
Pacific Coast (Gambill 5-7). Though its appeal was fairly limited to white, middle-class 
men, word of the movement and its activities spread through the media, in tones both 
approving and not.9  
Though the movement originated out of the women’s lib movement, not everyone 
who eventually prescribed to its beliefs believed in feminism. And at the same time, not 
every feminist supported their male counterparts. Some women felt the attempt to turn 
the conversation back to the problems men faced was just another way to “expand sexual 
conquests and reconstitute the patriarchy” (Gambill 12). Nor were all men’s rights 
activists willing to admit – or even aware of – the possibility that gay men had an equal 
claim to manhood. The movement was, overall, rarely unified and often at war with itself. 
                                                          
9 Indeed, proportionally speaking, it was more covered in the media than the percentage of men involved 
might otherwise suggest, giving it the appearance of a “media fad” (Nichols 11). 
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Multiple issues were raised within the movement – would men’s libbers also support 
nuclear disarmament? Oppose capitalism? Protest colonialism around the world? Not 
everyone felt the need to be so political or even to attempt to change much beyond 
themselves: in the words of one man, “I don’t want to be radical. I don’t want to stamp 
out sexism now. I just want to get my head on straight about men and women” (Gambill 
14). The political radicals within the movement split off in criticism of the men’s rights 
advocates’ “complacency and egocentricity” (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 574). For the 
radicals, the focus was fighting sexism rather than addressing personal issues. 
Two main schools of thought emerged in the movement: men who supported 
women’s lib, and men who supported men’s rights. Both used the language of sex roles 
to argue that men were forced into competition with each other and unable to express 
themselves, made to deny their “authentic selves” (Lynne Segal, quoted in New 737). 
“But where ‘anti-sexist’ men emphasized men’s agency in the oppression of women, and 
attempted to expose and resist prescriptive sex roles in order to undermine sexism, 
‘men’s rights’ activists were largely concerned with undoing the damage sex roles did to 
men” (New 737).10  
Men’s rights, in this case, came in multiple varieties. Conservatives, as part of the 
larger conservative movement, rejected any attempt to modify gender roles, instead 
working to defend the “traditional” standards they felt were at risk. Liberal men’s rights 
activists, who first appeared in 1975, supported feminism as well as reducing the burden 
                                                          
10 New notes that this divergence has carried over into current discussion of “masculinities,” Connell’s 
plural, with some, like Connell, rejecting the hegemonic singular masculinity while men’s rights 
proponents reject a “feminized” masculinity in favor of a moderated “natural” sex role. But she concludes 
that overall, perhaps “masculinity” is just not a concept strong enough to do all the work assigned to it, 
though she does not suggest an alternative (New 737). 
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of social pressures on men, though many who supported women’s lib felt that women had 
more power and privilege than they claimed to. It was this feeling of indignation over 
what they viewed as women’s excessive vitriol against men and demands for change that 
later led many of the liberal men’s rights activists to abandon their pro-feminist stance in 
the 1980s. Men’s rights also came to include a father’s rights movement, promoted most 
prominently by the organization known as Free Men, Incorporated – later renamed the 
National Coalition of Free Men, now the National Coalition for Men – advocating for 
greater rights for divorced fathers later in the 1970s, and particularly in the 1980s, to 
counter a perceived bias toward women in family courts. These activists claimed that the 
strictures of the breadwinner role were responsible for men’s less-active role in parenting, 
but that did not mean women should win custody by default. 
The seeds of the more conservative men’s rights were present in the formation of 
men’s lib, as many of the leaders of the movement – such as Warren Farrell, discussed 
further below – were white, upper-middle-class men, who “quietly benefit[ed] from 
patriarchy without being militant in its defense” (Connell 210). It was not in their 
economic or social interest to achieve true change of a system that gave them real and 
concrete advantage over almost every other demographic group in the country, and 
indeed, the constant defense of women’s complaints eventually turned into a sense that it 
was time for women (and gay men) to stop complaining and realize that the real victims 
here were white, straight, middle-class men. If sex roles were so oppressive, the 




Though articles on the male sex role started to appear in the 1940s, books on the 
subject – what are referred to somewhat mockingly as “Books About Men” (Carrigan, 
Connell and Lee 565, 599; Connell 24) – were published in some abundance by the mid-
1970s. Books discussed the issue of men from a variety of outlooks, some in favor of 
rethinking sex roles and some attempting to warn of the calamities that would befall the 
country should sex roles change in the slightest. Many writers were professors, often of 
sociology. Some were therapists or psychiatrists; at least one (Warren Farrell) was a 
lawyer. Though the authors’ styles differed to some extent, their subjects all tended to be 
white, married, straight men, generally of the middle- or upper-middle-class. That fit, as 
most of the authors tended to be white, straight, middle-class men themselves (though 
marriage status was not always obvious). Like later authors of books about masculinity, 
they often inserted themselves into their narratives, occasionally writing specifically 
about themselves and their experiences as (white, straight, middle-class) men in the 
1970s.  
As a common thread in the life experience of almost all men, work was a common 
theme in these Books About Men. The following is a look at a sample of books published 
from during the period, to explore how these writers thought about work within the 
context of the male sex role. 
One of the first books to be published was The Male in Crisis by Karl Bednarik, 
translated from the German by Helen Sebba and published in the U.S. in 1970. His thesis, 
that men had created the tools of their current technological imprisonment, noted that the 
crisis included the realm of “eros,” relationships between men and women, because the 
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birth control pill had made women too aggressive, which went against the traditional 
male role he believed to be true.  
Regarding work, he cited the development in human evolution of newer and 
better tools for every task, and bureaucratization as the inevitable result of an advanced 
technocratic society. “Since the manual and industrial trades have always been a 
masculine domain, the masculine way of life is obviously the first to be affected by these 
changes” (Bednarik 143), in that although the work is made easier through technological 
advance, the connection to work is made much more tenuous. He cites Stalin, who noted 
that the working man becomes “a little cog in the machine, insignificant, anonymous, a 
bit of human fuel for the supermachine of industrial culture, just as the soldier of today is 
merely cannon fodder for the machinery of war” (paraphrased in Bednarik 144). White-
collar workers in particular, which he accurately described as “the only social group that 
is still growing” (Bednarik 146), were especially unconnected from work, as much cogs 
in the system as the lower-status laborer but with less agency to rebel against the 
bureaucracy because they were more fully subjugated to it. The “white-collar” class was 
indeed an “artificially produced false consciousness … to keep all lower-grade 
employees starting with the office boy solidly lined up with the top bureaucrats,” despite 
their actual inability to break into that upper echelon of the bureaucracy (Bednarik 154).  
Bednarik claims the most “crucial sphere of male existence, the sphere of 
authority,” was the source of man’s greatest problem in the technocratic society 
(Bednarik 173). His authority was undermined by, among other things, his inability to 
express aggression naturally (as proscribed by the bureaucratization of work and war). 
The expanding federally-provided safety net injured his ability to fully act as father to his 
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children, as he was “eclipsed as a father by the institutions of the ‘father state,’” which 
provided what he was previously responsible for (Bednarik 182). Only by reclaiming his 
authority can man “best resist the feminizing and infantilizing tendencies of the time” 
(Bednarik 188), though he had no specific recommendations on that front. Bednarik’s 
Eurocentric tract was an early entry in the field of books about men but offered limited 
advice, acting instead as a list of complaints about the many crises of contemporary men. 
The best known author and leader of the American men’s lib movement was 
Warren Farrell, whose book, The Liberated Man (1974) was about his work as a leader of 
consciousness-raising groups and his thoughts about men. Farrell, who served three terms 
on the board of directors of the National Organization for Women and the head of its 
short-lived men’s group, was often cited in the media as a spokesman for the men’s 
movement. The Liberated Man, which went through five printings in 1975 (Gambill 6), 
attempts to establish a new vocabulary: “attaché” was to replace “husband” or “wife” as a 
unisex term meaning “a person with whom one has a deep emotional attachment” (Farrell 
xxxi). Instead of he/his/him and she/her/her, he proposed to use instead “te/tes/tir” 
(Farrell xxxi). Though these terms did not catch on, his unabashed feminism is further 
obvious in his discussion of the restrictions placed on women at work, in childcare, and 
in sexual relations with men. His fondness for surprisingly graphic imagery is evident in 
his descriptions of cynicism as “a man’s emotional diarrhea,” as “[r]eal emotions are 
stuck in his system” like emotional “constipation” (Farrell 71). Success at work is parallel 
to sexual success: “A man’s need for an upwardly mobile penis is only outpaced by the 
pressure to be upwardly mobile in his career” (Farrell 67).  
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Farrell suggests that women’s lib, by encouraging women to work, can help men 
in a number of work-related ways. A couple that is less reliant on one salary gives the 
husband more freedom to choose a job he likes, and keeps the wife from pressuring her 
husband to increase his job status. Benefits of women working were to be seen in the 
increased demand for cars, vacations, women’s business apparel, and similar industries. 
Women’s lib also “frees a man from being the sole source of his attaché’s happiness” as 
well as “allow[s] a man more autonomy in his personal life” (Farrell 187), win-win for 
all. Overcoming the pressure to compete at work is “not to return to mediocrity, it is to 
gain the freedom to escape mediocrity” (Farrell 63); men’s lib meant giving men the 
freedom “to change places with women, or switch jobs or even just resist on their jobs 
without risking the entire family income” (Farrell 65). Farrell’s memoir-like discussion of 
his own involvement and thoughts about feminism and men are easy enough to digest but 
offer little true thoughtfulness. 
Also published in 1974 was Men and Masculinity, an anthology of writings about 
men edited by Joseph Pleck and Jack Sawyer. Pleck was notable for having built an 
academic career on the male sex role, though Carrigan, Connell and Lee observe that “the 
fundamental intellectual incoherence of [the genre’s] general approach to masculinity is 
strikingly illustrated in his work” (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 572), in that his claims 
could vary depending on the audience and he did little sociological research to back up 
his work.  The pieces featured in Men and Masculinity were drawn from several sources, 
including Brother: A Forum for Men Against Sexism, a magazine about men’s issues 
published and originally circulated in the Bay Area (CA), but also the Harvard Business 
Review. As a result, the arguments about men at work varied in tone and approach, from 
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a medical explanation of the shorter male life-span due in part to the stress of working so 
hard for so long in “Some Lethal Aspects of the Male Role” by Sidney M. Jourard, to the 
pressures felt to succeed in “Measuring Masculinity by the Size of a Paycheck” by Robert 
E. Gould, M.D.  
As the editors noted, “[w]hether for money, prestige, or power” – but not, 
apparently, for family, an interesting omission – “we men work as hard as we do because 
we have learned that is what we are supposed to do – and learned it so gradually, so 
subtly, and so long ago that we do not remember we once did not need to work just to 
feel worthwhile” (Pleck and Sawyer 95). Gould observed that when masculinity was 
measured “by the size of a paycheck,” it was a precarious standard: 
The situation becomes even more complicated when “the head of the house” is 
competing against his wife’s paycheck as well as his own expectations. Recently, 
economic realities have made the two-paycheck family respectable. This is 
tolerable to Jack as long as he can provide for his family and Jill earns only 
enough to make all the “little extras” possible. … [But] if she can make real 
money, she is co-opting the man’s passport to masculinity (thus the stereotype of 
the successful woman being too masculine, too competitive, too unfeminine), and 
he is effectively castrated. (Emphasis his, Gould in Pleck and Sawyer 98) 
Gould felt that perhaps masculinity should be reconfigured to mean the ability to give and 
receive love rather than make money, an attitude that would not be shared by the young 
executives and their wives interviewed by Fernando Bartolomé for the Harvard Business 
Review, all of whom were white Anglo-Saxon Protestants (except for a few couples of 
Irish descent). One executive noted that “[t]he ones who concentrate more on 
communicating with their wives and families are those who have realized that they aren’t 
going to make it and therefore they have changed their focus of attention” (quoted in 
Pleck and Sawyer 103). Achieving was an easier measure of masculine success than 
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feelings or family relationships, which was a different kind of pressure than that to 
support a family but one that could be equally if not more demanding. This is also in a 
way an explanation and justification of bad parenting: to be a good father is to be a 
failure. The sociological approach of the essays in Men and Masculinity makes their 
conclusions somewhat more reliable than those of other authors. 
Men’s Liberation, by Jack Nichols (1975), on the other hand, was an idiosyncratic 
examination of the many ways men were “shackled” by personal, romantic, and social 
demands, with the aim of providing “visionary alternatives for future living patterns that 
each man can freely choose for himself” (Nichols 11-13). Assigning men the single role 
of provider, “a designation signifying they are beasts of burden,” might, he thought, be 
related to men having a shorter life-span, much as Jourard discussed in Men and 
Masculinity (Pleck and Sawyer 121). Success was based on the number of possessions 
amassed, and thus by increasing the salary so that more possessions could be acquired, as 
Gould discussed in Men and Masculinity. “What this means for today’s beleaguered male 
is that he may feel greater exhilarations if he does not become demented with the mania 
of owning things” (Nichols 131). Being a father has become reduced to “financial 
functionary” (Nichols 252). Similar to Farrell, Pleck, and other writers, but not to the 
above-mentioned young executives, Nichols felt that greater happiness and true equality 
would be achieved through closer relationships with one’s children, not success at work. 
Another anthology discussing the same topics (with some of the same essays) as 
Men and Masculinity was The Forty-Nine Percent Majority, edited by Deborah David 
and Robert Brannon (1976). The Forty-Nine Percent Majority, however, unlike Men and 
Masculinity, was broader in scope as well as chronological range, and included short 
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stories like James Thurber’s “The Secret Life of Walter Mitty” and poems like Rudyard 
Kipling’s “If,” as examples of masculinity in other genres. Discussion of work included a 
1966 essay by Myron Benton, “The Breadwinner,” in which he cited a contemporary 
study in which almost two-thirds of a sample of women stated their husbands’ primary 
role was that of breadwinner, followed by father, and “husband, a poor third” (Brenton in 
David and Brannon 92). Brenton notes that modern men, likely employed by someone 
else, were alienated from the work itself and focused instead of the “fruits” of the work: 
pay, prestige, status, possessions, and support of their families (David and Brannon 94). 
With masculinity so closely tied to work, the job choice was of greater consequence and 
constriction, either by class status or perceived masculine qualities. Status within the job 
was also hazardous, susceptible to erosion by technological advance. “[B]y depending so 
heavily on his breadwinning role to validate his sense of himself as a man, instead of also 
letting his roles as husband, father, and citizen of the community count as validating 
sources, the American male treads on psychically dangerous ground. It’s always 
dangerous to put all of one’s psychic eggs into one basket” (Brenton in David and 
Brannon 93). 
Also in that collection was Arthur B. Shostak’s 1969 essay, “Blue-Collar Work.” 
Blue-collar men, who “begin and end the workday with the knowledge that their employ 
could hardly have less status,” are more tied to the work itself as confirmation of 
manliness in some ways than middle-class men, particularly in skilled craft work 
(Shostak in David and Brannon 98). This carries its own precariousness in less skilled 
work with the increased simplification of jobs and the subsequent entry of women and 
younger men into the workforce. As Sennett and Cobb would later find, Shostak noted 
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that many blue-collar fathers, though disparaging of white-collar “pencil pushers,” would 
push their own sons to a more white-collar job than following the “‘old man’ into the 
plant. . . . One wonders at what price to family solidarity and father-son relations comes 
the presence of the father as a negative reference model, a man who insists his career is 
not to be emulated, but is to be avoided?” (David and Brannon 104) 
 
In the opening essay of The Forty-Nine Percent Majority, Brannon gives a short 
history of the male sex role, the discovery of which he dates back only to the discovery of 
the female sex role first propounded upon by the women’s movement starting in the mid-
1960s, though in this he is mistaken.11 As the “fish will be the last to discover the ocean,” 
so it is hard for them to study it, even knowing it is there, as “[i]ts values and assumptions 
have so infiltrated our minds that we’re almost blind to them; only gradually and 
imperfectly can we distangle them and give them names.” Though white men have been 
the oppressors if not the oppressed, they too are “wounded” by the “cruel demands” of 
sex roles (David and Brannon 4-5).  
R.W. Connell critiques these Books About Men as doing little new research, but 
instead just assembling “familiar items such as feminist criticisms of men, media images 
of masculinity, paper-and-pencil tests of attitudes, findings of sex differences and 
autobiographical anecdotes about sport” (Connell 24). Indeed, Bednarik bases his study 
of sex roles on observations like homosexuality being a result of “a false orientation at an 
                                                          
11 Carrigan, Connell and Lee cite as particularly critical the work of sociologist Helen Hacker, who wrote in 
the late 1950s about the conflicts within men to live up to the expectations of masculinity. Though her 
conclusions did not all prove true, “most research on masculinity [since hers] has not improved on her 
analysis,” yet she is mentioned by none of the men’s issues authors (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 560-561). 
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early stage of sexual maturation” (Bednarik 81), due to absent fathers and overattentive 
mothers, an explanation found in other work by men’s lib writers (Marc Feigen Fasteau, 
Farrell), but one that has by now been entirely discredited. But perhaps the true value of 
these books, as self-indulgent and short-sighted as they often are, is that they provide the 
basis for the studies that Connell and other masculine studies scholars would later do. 
Was men’s studies an inevitable topic of scholarship? Would men’s studies be where it is 
today if these men had not been the first to talk about external social pressures on men? 
Though analysis of sex roles had appeared before the 1970s, the personalization of the 
field was in some ways directly responsible for the personal feelings on the history of 
masculinity expressed by later scholars such as Kimmel and Rotundo, who were more 
able than their predecessors to view the field beyond a male/female “us versus them” 
mentality. 
 
The men’s liberation movement as it began in the 1970s did not end particularly 
well, dissolving into in-fighting and conflicting objectives. Carter, the most influential 
example of a more sensitive man of the 1970s, was an uninspiring president. By the early 
1980s, some feminists started criticizing the “New Man” as one who was “feminized” but 
not “feminist” (Barbara Ehrenreich, quoted in Gambill 32). Many within the men’s 
movement started turning against feminists, asserting men’s own pressures and stresses 
were as heavy and oppressive as those of women. While men’s studies were spreading 
throughout American campuses, also not without controversy, the original men’s lib 
organizations slowly died out during the 1980s due to lack of direction. Warren Farrell, 
who had been a symbol of the pro-feminist men’s lib movement, shifted entirely to an 
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anti-feminist position, insisting instead that men were equally as powerless as women and 
that more attention should be paid to their suffering. But “[a]s this might seem to 
contradict the facts he had noticed in the early 1970s, Farrell carefully redefined power 
by shifting from the public world to the inner world of emotion. Men did not feel 
emotionally in control of their lives, therefore they lacked power” (Connell 208). New 
quotes an illuminating passage in Susan Faludi’s work on men and feminism in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Backlash (1992): 
“Men are hurting more than women – that is, men are, in many ways, actually 
more powerless than women now.” Warren Farrell pauses to sip from the coffee 
mug that his female housekeeper has just handed him. In another room his female 
secretary is busy typing and tidying his files. “The women’s movement has 
turned out to be not a movement for equality but a movement for women’s 
maximization of opportunities,” he says. (New 737) 
 
Men’s libbers fragmented, finally unwilling to fully face the privileges that they still 
maintained and would have to give up in order to fully achieve “liberation,” whatever 
that term actually meant. This conservative shift was an effort to repel criticism and 
counter real or perceived unfairness in how white men were treated. Advocacy of men’s 
rights survives in varying forms like the mythopoetic men’s movement of Robert Bly, 
locating the key to personal happiness in adhering to ancient gender roles and traditions, 
or organizations like the National Center for Men, incorporated in 1987, which claims to 
have “steadfastly put forth a fair and progressive masculist point of view even when that 
view was unpopular” (The National Center for Men: Our History), working in favor of 
such issues as men’s reproductive rights. This feeling of defending oneself even when it 
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It has been noted recently that there remains a strong sense in current discourse 
that men are still vulnerable (Malone 12; Peck). The fact that more women attend college 
than men remains a popular subject of discussion in the media and is analyzed from 
various angles, as is the ascendance of women to various positions of political, corporate, 
or social power. Such reiteration can lend itself to a feeling that women overall are 
gaining power as, more importantly, men are losing it. This, like the economic changes 
we see today, was a trend that began in the 1970s.  
The country changed in the 1970s, never to return to the way things had been 
before, and in that, as one man said, “one hardly knows if there are more grounds for 
hope or for despair” (Koch 156). This feeling that white men are oppressed, despite 
continuing to be the demographic holding the greatest amount of influence socially, 
economically, and politically, is based on several elements, some of which could be seen 
in the men’s lib movement as well as in working-class male voters’ shift rightward. The 
idea of being called to account for the historical oppression of not just white women but 
men and women of other races felt unfair and overblown to men who were themselves 
not in any obvious position of power except at home. And there, too, their roles were 
threatened by the increase in wives who worked, and who expected greater help in 
housework from their spouses in exchange for their own financial contributions, not to 
mention more orgasms. Taking into account social pressure to act tough, not express 
emotion, impress women, and succeed at work, these men felt that not only were they not 
in any actual position of power, but that they were unable to really be themselves, and 
therefore, they were just as subject to the demands of others as women claimed to be.  
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This feeling of being bombarded on all sides occurred alongside a feeling of being 
let down by the government, and especially the Democratic Party, the traditional home of 
working-class white men. A thoroughly frustrating Carter administration, which 
supported labor halfheartedly and ignored the problems of deindustrialization and 
unemployment, only brought home for many men a feeling that their party had 
abandoned them in favor of women, minorities, and the young, the very people who 
claimed white men had too much power. The result of electing a “New Man” like Carter 
was that it seemed to show that attempting to change the male sex role, at least in terms 
of political leadership, was a mistake. Manly men were needed to restore America to 
world dominance and white men to personal dominance. Rather than Carter’s talk of 
personal responsibility, Reagan proclaimed that “we are first; we are the best. … How 
can we not believe in the greatness of America?” (quoted in Rodgers 25)  
When faced with the positive encouragement of Reagan’s traditional, religiously-
based masculinity, supporting “a systematic reassertion of old-fashioned models of 
masculinity” (Carrigan, Connell and Lee 599), it was not surprising that the white-male 
voting bloc became largely Republican for the rest of the century. “Manhood and moral 
values were both born of the same fundamental belief that Democrats no longer 
represented the character of the classic man. Only one party seemingly stood up for faith, 
family, and virtue, a belief system born of God and country, and for a world slowly being 
chopped away by modernity” (Kuhn 82). Though the 1980s began with what would 
become a harsh recession, further adding to the spread of deindustrialization and 
increasing the unemployment rate, there was hope that Reagan – who won in 1980 
mostly by not being Carter, but who won an impressive reelection in 1984 on his own 
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ostensible merit – would be the masculine leader America needed. And he was, just not 
for the working- and middle-class men and women whose tax share went up as that of big 
business and the wealthy went down.  
The neoliberalization of the American economy sent more jobs overseas and did 
further damage to union power as the finance industry expanded considerably. As part of 
a wave of deregulation that had actually begun during Carter’s administration, Reagan 
deregulated the National Labor Relations Board so it was able to attack unions rather than 
support them, as it had been intended to do (Harvey 51). In crushing the strike of air 
traffic controllers in 1981 he helped to shift public opinion even further against organized 
labor. The central focus of the federal government had moved from the proverbial Main 
Street to the actual Wall Street, and would remain so for the following decades; “[i]n the 
event of a conflict between Main Street and Wall Street, the latter was to be favored. The 
real possibility then arises that while Wall Street does well the rest of the U.S. (as well as 
the rest of the world) does badly. And for several years, particularly during the 1990s, 
this is exactly what happened” (Harvey 33). Peck observes that this process has continued 
in the present: 
Over time, the United States has expected less and less of its elite, even as 
society has oriented itself in a way that is most likely to maximize their income. . 
. . As America’s winners have been separated more starkly from its losers, the 
idea of compensating the latter out of the pockets of the former has met stiff 
resistance: that would run afoul of another economic theory, dulling the winners’ 
incentives and squashing their entrepreneurial spirit; some, we are reminded, 
might even leave the country. And so, in a neat and perhaps unconscious two-
step, many elites have pushed policies that benefit them, by touting theoretical 
gains to society—then ruled out measures that would distribute those gains 
widely. (Peck 78) 
Though Reagan, like his cinematic warrior Rambo, the main character of a hugely 
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successful action series in the 1980s, was supposed to stand for the revival of the 
collective national spirit, Reagan’s “hard-body” America turned out to be limited to only 
the hardest of bodies or the richest of bank accounts, white men built like tanks who were 
willing and able to pour gunpowder in their own arrow wound and light it on fire, or risk 
losing millions in daily trading on Wall Street. They were entitled to the benefits of 
American society that they had earned, and “whereas weak men may not be actual 
enemies, they are nonetheless not entitled to the profits due to those whose strength” – or 
financial acumen – “insures the survival of the nation as a whole” (Jeffords 52). The 
resurgent masculinity of the 1980s was, in the end, not meant to apply to all white men, 
much less all men in general.  
  
Much like the 1970s, unemployment today is high, and many will spend a long 
time unemployed before finding a new job. The New Deal safety net continues to erode 
under political and social pressure, collective bargaining is frequently attacked by 
Republican politicians, and the differences between the very rich and everyone else 
continue to increase. Men now are no more secure in work and providing than they were 
almost forty years ago. Though Kimmel originally observed those similarities in the mid-
1990s (Kimmel 241), they are still quite true in the twenty-first century.  
We are still feeling the effects of the dismantling of the manufacturing sector of 
the economy that became the norm in the 1970s, both in terms of trade deficits with 
countries from whom the U.S. buys goods, and a workforce made up mostly of jobs in 
the services sector, 83% as of 2007 (Lee and Mather 7). During the recession that began 
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2007 and apparently ended in 2009, though recovery has not been particularly strong, 
“men lost 71 percent of the jobs that disappeared . . . even as the outlook was sunnier in 
pink-collar jobs like nursing and teaching, and women for the first time made up more 
than 50 percent of the workforce” (though she does not differentiate by race, just by 
gender; Malone 12). Since then, though women still have a lower unemployment rate 
than men, 8.5% to 9.5%, men have regained 768,000 jobs as women have lost 218,000, 
often in “pink-collar” fields. A Pew report “shows that retail, education, and health 
services all hired more men than women during the past few years” (Malone 12).  
In a recent article in The Atlantic, however, Don Peck disagrees with Malone’s 
belief that men are recovering well (though he does not differentiate by race, either): 
According to the Harvard economist Lawrence Katz, since the mid-1980s, the 
labor market has been placing a higher premium on creative, analytic, and 
interpersonal skills, and the wages of men without a college degree have been 
under particular pressure. . . . During the aughts, construction provided an outlet 
for the young men who would have gone into manufacturing a generation ago. 
Men without higher education ‘didn’t do as badly as you might have expected, on 
long-run trends, because of the housing bubble.’ But it’s hard to imagine another 
such construction boom coming to their rescue. (Peck 65) 
Manufacturing has lost about four million jobs since 2001, but manufacturing, 
construction, transportation and utilities were “more heavily dominated by men in 2009 
than they’d been nine years earlier” (Peck 65). Peck attributes this to the growing value 
placed on computer and interpersonal skills in business, and the divide between those 
with a college degree and those without; men tend to receive fewer degrees than women, 
and less training in the skills needed for white-collar work, which sends more of them to 
blue-collar jobs. But those jobs are disappearing, and men as a group do not seem open to 
a change in occupation. Peck suggests increasing the use of career-academy programs in 
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high schools, in part to open boys’ minds to work in fields like health care in which they 
do not show enough interest, given the growth of such “pink-collar” work while blue-
collar declines; “these programs might even help weaken the grip of the various 
stereotypes that seem to be keeping some boys locked into declining parts of the 
economy” (Peck 76). The constraints of masculinity are no weaker now than they were in 
the 1970s. 
 
So what really changed? For most people, the changes of the 1970s appeared in 
smaller events, a series of more immediate questions – should men still hold the door for 
women? Should a woman still take her husband’s name? Was a man still expected to be 
the sole provider? While the first two questions were a matter of personal opinion (and 
still are today), the last was where true change became apparent.  
By the 1980s, in all families, even the conservative ones, working wives became 
conventional, due to economic need and increased job opportunity. Until the mid-1970s, 
mothers of young children were the least likely to work, but by 1987, the pattern of 
female participation rates by age looked much more like that of men, with a marked 
increase in work participation between the ages of 25 and 44 (Shank 4). In 1987, 55% of 
women with children under the age of three worked, while in 1967 that number was less 
than 25% (Shank 4). For the first time, the participation rates became much more similar 
for white and nonwhite women. The 1980s also marked the first time that more women 
became as career-oriented as men, working longer hours (though still fewer than men) 
and remaining committed to the job held before the children were born, often returning 
immediately after (Shank 5-6). Though the earnings gap remained as women tended to 
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work in lower-paying jobs, or were simply paid less for the same job (Mellor 18-19), by 
the late 1990s, almost 25% of wives in dual-earner marriages made more than their 
husbands (Winkler 42). 
The personal consequences of a series of massive economic and social changes 
such as those seen during the decade of the 1970s are internalized differently by different 
people. The urge to recover a threatened sense of authority and power among white men 
was based on real social, economic, and political changes that worked to benefit others 
over them. For those who had lost jobs or could not afford to live well even with a wife’s 
salary, being passed over as a group worthy of aid and awareness just for being white 
seemed thoroughly unfair, though the irony was perhaps unnoticed (and in the men’s lib 
genre, completely overlooked). White men became conservative because it offered them 
some measure of defense, tools to retain or at least attempt to retain some power that 
being more liberal, politically or otherwise, did not give them when work was no longer 
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